Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (2000– )
2015

The State of Utah v. Lissette Marian Dejesus : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons

Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah.
Recommended Citation
Article, Utah v. Dejesus, No. 20150460 (Utah Supreme Court, 2015).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/3184

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (2000– ) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons.
Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/
policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
V.

LISSETTE MARIAN DEJESUS,

Case No. 20150460-SC
Appellant is incarcerated.

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a conviction for one count of Assault by a Prisoner, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code § 76-5-102.5, in the Third Judicial District, in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Bruce Lubeck, presiding.

JOAN C. WATT (3967)
ALEXANDRA MCCALLUM (15198)
WESLEY J. HOWARD (9005)
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
SEAN REYES (7969)
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

SEP 2 9 2015

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
V.

LISSETTE MARIAN DEJESUS,
Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20150460- SC
Appellant is incarcerated.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a conviction for one count of Assault by a Prisoner, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code § 76-5-102.5, in the Third Judicial District, in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Bruce Lubeck, presiding.

JOAN C. WATT (3967)
ALEXANDRA MCCALLUM (15198)
WESLEY J. HOWARD (9005)
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
SEAN REYES (7969)
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 841 14
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................................... ........................................ V
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT .................................................................................... I
STATEMENT OF ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION .................... 1
RELEVANT STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS ..................... ......... ........................................................................................ 2
STATEMENT OF CASE ..... ....................................... ..................................................... ... 2
STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................................................................................. 3

Testimony regarding the incident supported
DeJesus 's defense .............. ........ ........................... ............................................. 3
A video captured the event,· the guard viewed the
videotape and testified that viewing it filled in gaps
in his perception and memory ...................... ........... ................ .......................... 5
The State failed to preserve the videotape ................................... ...................... 5
DeJesus moved to dismiss the charge based on the
violation ofher state due process rights ..... ....................... ............................... 7
The trial court incorrectly denied the motion to dismiss............... ... ................. 8
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ......................................................................................... 10
ARGUMENT .................................................. .............................................................. ..... 13
THE STATE'S FAILURE TO PRESERVE A VIDEOTAPE
THAT RECORDED THE INCIDENT VIOLATED STATE
DUE PROCESS .................................. .............................................................. 13
A. The state due process balancing test adopted in Tiedemann
does not include a threshold requirement that the defendant

ii

•
establish a reasonable probability that the evidence would be
exculpatory ............................. ...................... .......... ...... ............................... 16
B. Proper application of the state due process balancing test
establishes that the state's destruction of the videotape of the
alleged incident violates due process .......................................................... 23

1. The rule 16factors, which were not considered by the
trial court, demonstrate that the destruction ofthe
videotape violated state due process ................................................ 24

•

2. The record shows that there is a reasonable probability
the destroyed video recording would be exculpatory ...................... 32

3. The reason for the destruction and the prejudice to
DeJesus require that this case be dismissed .................................... 41
1.

The video was both material and imp01tant to
DeJesus's defense, and the state's destruction of
the video was prejudicial.. ..... ................................................ 42

11.

The state's failure to preserve the recording was
highly culpable and weighs in favor of dismissal ................. 45

C. This issue is preserved ................................................................................. 46
CONCLUSION ......................... ........ .... ..................................................................... ....... 49
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY ............. ......................................................................... 50
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ........................................ ...................... .................. 50

•
iii

•

INDEX TO ADDENDA
ADDENDUM A: Sentence, Judgment, Commitment
ADDENDUM B: Certification Order
ADDENDUM C: State v. Tiedmann, 2007 UT 49, 162 P.3d 1106
ADDENDUM D: Trial Comt' s Memorandum Decision R . 126-40
ADDENDUM E: Utah Const. art. I, § 7

iv

•
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988) .................................................... 13, 14, 22, 37
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) ...................................................................... 20, 22
California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984) .................................................................. 22
Catlett v. State, 585 P.2d 553 n. 5 (Alaska 1978) ............................................................. 42
Com. v. Fowlin, 676 A.2d 665 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) ........................................................ 43
Commonwealth v. Henderson, 582 N.E.2d 496 (Mass. 1991) .............................. 14, 17, 18
Hammond v. State, 569 A.2d 81 (Del. 1989) ................................ 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 33, 34
Hill v. Superior Prop. Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 2013 UT 60, 321 P.3d 1054 .......................... .47
Kennon v. Air Quality Ed., 2009 UT 77,270 P.3d 417 ..................................................... 21
Low v. City ofMonticello, 2004 UT 90, 103 P.3d 130 ...................................................... 21
People v. Handy, 988 N.E.2d 879 (N.Y. 2013) ........................................................... 28, 30
People v. Sweeney , 859 N.Y.S.2d 898, 2008 WL 451436 (Albany City Ct. 2008) .......... 31
Peschel v. City OfMissoula, 664 F. Supp. 2d 1137 (D. Mont. 2009) ......................... 28, 30
Pettit v. Smith, 45 F. Supp. 3d 1099 (D. Ariz. 2014) .................................................. 27, 45
State v. Bailey, 475 A.2d 1045 (Vt. 1984) ......................................................................... 34
State v. Blake, 2002 UT 113, 63 P.3d 56 .............. ........................................... 35, 36, 37, 40
State v. Carda!!, 1999 UT 51,982 P.2d 79 ................... ........................................ 36, 37, 40
State v. Delisle, 648 A.2d 632 (Vt. 1994) ............................................................. 14, 18, 34
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993) ................................................................ ........ 48

V

State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912 (Tenn. 1999) ............................................... 14, 18, 20, 42
State v. Fouse, 2014 UT App 29,319 P.3d 778 ....................................................... ........ .48
State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14, 152 P.3d 321 ......................... .............................................. .40
State v. Harris, 2012 UT 77,289 P.3d 591 ..................................... ... ............................... 48
State v. Jackson, 2010 UT App 328, 243 P.3d 902 .................... ................................. 15, 25
State v. Kallin, 877 P.2d 138 (Utah 1994) ............................. ...................................... 22, 25
State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987) ...................................................... 28, 32, 34, 35
State v. Matafeo, 787 P.2d 671 (Haw. 1990) ..................................................................... 14
State v. Merriman, 410 S. W.3d 779 (Tenn. 2013) ..................................................... .42, 44
State v. Morales, 657 A.2d 585 (Conn. 1995) ............. 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 27, 33, 41, 42
State v. Osakalumi, 461 S.E.2d 504 (W.Va. 1995) ..................................................... 14, 18
State v. Otkovic, 2014 UT App 58,322 P.2d 746 ........................................ ......... 15, 47, 49
State v. Shabata, 678 P .2d 785 (Utah 1984) ............................ .......................................... 28
Statev. Tiedemann,2007UT49, 162 P.3d 1106 .......................................................passim
State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839 (Utah 1988) ................................................... 22, 35, 36, 39
Thorne v. Dep 't. ofPub. Safety,
774P.2d 1326(Alaska 1989) .......... .................................... 14, 17, 19, 21 ,23,33,34,38
United States v. Miranda, 526 F.2d 1319 (2nd Cir. 1975) ................................................ 33
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y.2003) ................................... 30
Statutes

Utah Code§ 76-5-102.5 .................. ............. ................................................................. 1, 43

vi

Utah Code§ 78A-3-102 ...................................................................................................... I
Utah Code §76-2-402 ..... ......................................... ... ............... ........................................ 43
Utah Code §76-5-102 .......... ........................................... ....... ............................................ 43

Rules
Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure ....... 8, 10, 11,13, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31

Constitutional Provisions
Utah Const. art. I, § 7 .................................. ................................................................passim

vii

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
V.

LISSETTE MARIAN DEJESUS,

Case No. 20150460-SC

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for Assault by a Prisoner, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code§ 76-5-102.5. See Addendum A (Sentence,
Judgment, Commitment). The comi of appeals certified this appeal to this Comi. See
Addendum B (Certification Order). Utah Code § 78A-3-102(3)(b) confers jurisdiction.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION

Issue: Whether the State's destruction of a video of the alleged incident which
occmTed at the prison violated state due process requiring dismissal where, among other
things, the video captured the incident, there was evidence supporting the defense and
contrary to the State's depiction of what occmTed, and the State was culpable in failing to
preserve the video.
Standard ofReview: "Whether the State's destruction of potentially exculpatory

evidence violates due process is a question of law that [this Comi] review[s] for
c01Tectness." State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ,112, 162 P.3d 1106 (Addendum C).

'"However, because this question requires application of facts in the record to the due
process standard, [this Court] incorporate[s] a clearly eIToneous standard for the
necessary subsidiary factual determinations."' Id.
Preservation: This issue is preserved. See R.37-44; 78-85; 92-100; 172, 174, 175;

126-140 (trial court's ruling on motion to dismiss in Addendum D).
RELEVANT STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Const. art. I, § 7 is in Addendum E.
STATEMENT OF CASE
The incident in this case allegedly occmTed at the prison on September 27, 2013.
R. 1. Almost four months later, the State filed an Information charging Appellant,
Lissette Marie DeJesus, with Assault by a Prisoner. Three days after the court appointed
counsel, DeJesus filed a motion for discovery, followed two days later by a Supplemental
Discovery Request specifying fmther that the defense was requesting "[a] copy of the
video of the alleged incident." R.4, 18.
The State responded to the Supplemental Discovery Motion more than four
months after it was filed, stating "[t]he State is unable to provide any video of the
incident as none exist as per the Utah State Prison." R.25.
Following preliminary hearing and bindover (R.30-31), DeJesus filed a "Motion to
Dismiss for Failure to Preserve Evidence," claiming that her state due process rights were
violated by the State's failure to preserve the surveillance footage of the incident. R.3744, 78-84. After the trial court held an initial hearing, R.174, Dejesus filed a
"Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss." R.92-100. Following
2
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two more hearings, R.172, 175, the comt issued a memorandum decision denying
DeJesus's motion. R.126-40; Addendum D. Subsequently, DeJesus filed a petition
seeking interlocutory review, which the court of appeals denied. R.144-45.
DeJesus entered a Se,y plea, reserving her right to appeal the trial comt's ruling.
R.150-56; 173:3. She conditionally pleaded guilty to Assault by a Prisoner and was
sentenced to serve 0-5 years in prison concmrently with the commitments she was
already serving. R.148-49, 150-56.
After DeJesus timely appealed, R.159-60, the court of appeals ce1tified the appeal
to this Cornt.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Testimony regarding the incident supported DeJesus 's defense.

In the fall of 2013, DeJesus was an inmate housed in Timpanogos 3 at the Utah
State Prison. R.56-58. She shared a cell with inmate Dash; inmate Khan lived in the
neighboring cell. R.57, 62.
On September 27, 2013, DeJesus was in her cell when Officer Ronald Hansen
("the guard" or "Hansen") escorted Dash and Khan back to their respective cells after
recreation time. R.56-57. The guard directed Khan to stand in front of her cell door, but
she disobeyed and stood in front of DeJesus's door instead. R.63. The women began
arguing and DeJesus's cell door opened prematurely. R.58-59, 63-64. According to the
guard, DeJesus "came out and swung at[] Khan." R.59. The guard testified that he pulled
DeJesus off of Khan, picked her up and caiTied her back to her cell, but was not able to
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secure the cell door. R.59. He testified that DeJesus then came out of her cell, and she
and Khan engaged in mutual combat. R.60, 69.
The guard inserted himself between the women and pushed DeJesus to the floor.
R.60. At the preliminary hearing, the guard testified that DeJesus "looked directly at
[him] and then kicked" him in the lower abdomen and the right thigh while Khan was
"behind [him] a few feet." R.60. But on cross-examination, he testified that Khan was
"on [his] back" dming the incident and he "d[id]n't know exactly where she was" as he
"could not see" Khan. R. 70.
Inmate Ataata, who identified herself as DeJesus's fiancee, lived in an adjacent
cell and viewed most of the incident. R.175: 17-20. She testified at the evidentiary hearing
that there was no point at which Khan disengaged and that she did not stand a few feet
back from DeJesus and the guard. R.175: 17-20. Instead, as the guard had testified on
cross during the preliminary hearing, Ataata testified that Khan was on the guard's back
during the incident. R.17 5: 17-19. Khan was attempting to "swing" "over [the guard] to
get to DeJesus." R.17 5:17-19. Dash, who was also present during the incident, invoked
her right against self-incrimination and did not testify. R. 175: 14-15.
DeJesus denied "that she intentionally kicked Officer Hansen and [maintained]
that if there was any contact with the officer, it was purely accidental and not done
intending to cause him bodily injury" while reasonably defending herself against Khan's
imminent attack. R.40.

4
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A video captured the event,· the guard viewed the videotape and testified that
viewing it filled in gaps in his perception and memory.

The guard viewed a videotape of the event about fifteen minutes after the alleged
altercation ended. R. 71-73. A surveillance camera, which was functioning properly, had
been aimed at the exact area where the altercation occurred and had captured that event.
R.71-73.
The guard testified at the evidentiary hearing regarding what he remembered
seeing on the videotape. He said the videotape showed that Khan was disengaged and
was about four to six feet behind him when he pushed DeJesus to the ground. R.175:3.
When confronted about his prior testimony that Khan was on his back and he did not see
where Khan was at the time of the assault, the guard testified that he meant he did not
know where she was while the incident was occmTing. R.175:4-7. He indicated that he
later learned Khan's location by viewing the video. R.175:6.
The State failed to preserve the videotape.

Although the incident was recorded and the guard immediately viewed the
recording, a permanent copy was not made, and the recording was destroyed. R.172:6.
The guard wrote an incident report and gave it to his supervisor, Captain Redding
("the captain"). R.175:8-9. The captain turned the repo1i over to the prison investigations
unit, and about an hour and a half after the incident, an investigator talked with the guard.
R.175:9. Although the guard had immediately viewed the recording, he could not order
that a pe1manent copy be made. Rl 75:10.
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The digital recording was available in the control room, and both the captain and
the investigator had "access to watch a playback[.]" R.17 5: 11. Neither testified regarding
the details of the recording, and there is no evidence that either the captain or the
investigator watched the video.
Investigator Kemp ("the investigator") is employed by the Department of
Con-ections as part of the Law Enforcement Bureau. R.172:2. Her job is "to investigate
any criminal matter; state, federal, in the prison system and outside." R.172:2.
The investigator responded to Timpanogos 3 and went first to the officers' station.
R.172:3. She asked whether there was a recording and learned that there was one and that
it had been viewed. R.172:3. After being "shown where the incident occun-ed" and
conducting interviews, she returned to the control room and asked that a permanent copy
of the recording be made. R.172:3. The officer in the control room was new and the
investigator did not know her name. R.172:5-6.
The investigator testified that the prison does not have a policy regarding the
permanent retention of recordings from prison surveillance cameras. R.172:2. Recordings
stay on the surveillance equipment for only thi1ty days and then are recorded over if a
permanent copy is not requested. R.172:5-6, 8; R.129. Permanent copies are made in the
control room. R.172:6. Either the captain or a lieutenant could have made a permanent
copy. R. 172:7.
The investigator got busy and did not follow-up. R. 172:4. She had to do more
background checks on applicants than she normally did, and therefore did not pay
attention to this investigation during the thi1ty days or more following the event. R.172:4,

6

7. When the investigator finally followed-up, she contacted several people to h·y to locate
the recording; again, she could not give the names of the people she had talked to.
R.172:6, 8. They told her to contact the captain. R.172:6. The captain, who was able to
download the video without a request from the investigator, told the investigator that
"after 30 days, it goes off the camera." R.172:6. The captain also said that if a copy had
been made, it had been misplaced and that "she had never seen a copy." R.172:6. The
state did not present any written documentation showing that the request for a permanent
copy of the videotape was made or followed-up on.
Charges were not filed for almost four months, again because the investigator was
busy doing checks on applicants. R.172:4. By that time, the recording had been
destroyed. R.172:6. Immediately after being appointed, defense counsel filed a motion
for discovery, followed by a supplemental motion specifically requesting a copy of the
video. R.4, 18. The State did not respond to the Supplemental Discovery Request for
almost four months. R.25. When the State did respond, it did not tell the defense that a
video had been made, but had not been preserved; instead, it stated "[t]he State is unable
to provide any video of the incident as none exist as per the Utah State Prison." R.25.
DeJesus moved to dismiss the charge based on the violation of her state due
process rights.
DeJesus filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Preserve Evidence, arguing that
the State's destruction of the surveillance video capturing the alleged assault violated
state due process. R.37-44; see also R.45-53; 78-85. During argument, the trial court
suggested that DeJesus had "to make a showing that there's reasonable probability that
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the destroyed evidence would be exculpatory" before it considered "the other factors of
the good or bad faith of the State, and the prejudice." R.174: 1-2. The court then decided
that it needed additional evidence before ruling, and scheduled the matter for an
evidentiary hearing. R.174: 17-24.
Before the evidentiary hearing, DeJesus filed a supplemental memorandum. R.92100. That supplemental memorandum argued in part that state due process and

Tiedemann did not require a defendant to make a threshold showing that there is a

"reasonable probability" that the destroyed evidence would be exculpatory. R.92-100.
DeJesus fmiher explained that in dete1mining whether state due process was violated by
the destruction of evidence, the trial comi was required to consider the rule 16 factors
discussed in Tiedemann regardless of whether she demonstrated a reasonable probability
that the video would be exculpatory. R.94-96. Additionally, the trial court was "obligated
to also consider the reason for the loss of evidence and the prejudice to Ms. DeJesus,"
because evidence already in the record showed a reasonable probability that the destroyed
evidence would be exculpatory. R.97-99.
The trial court incorrectly denied the motion to dismiss.

The trial comi issued a memorandum decision denying DeJesus's motion to
dismiss. R.126-40; Addendum D. The court concluded that a defendant "must first
demonstrate," as a threshold matter, "a ' reasonable probability' that lost or destroyed
evidence would be exculpatory." R.132-33. It stated that "[t]he only possible evidence [of
the video's exculpatory value] ... [wa]s the testimony of Ataata" and her testimony "was
not believable and thus [] not reasonable." R.134-35. The comi then concluded that
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DeJesus failed to show a reasonable probability that the recording was exculpatory and it
therefore did "not need to examine the reasons for the destruction or ... the degree of
prejudice suffered by defendant." R.13 5.
Neve1iheless, the comi decided to examine the reason for the video's destruction
in case it was "wrong" about the exculpatory nature of the recording. R.135. The comi
recognized that if the video had been consistent with the guard's testimony, "common
sense would indicate that recording would be retained." R.136. On the other hand, if the
video "showed contrary to what Hansen said, then it would make more logical sense to
destroy it rather than if it supported him." R.136. Moreover, the court found it "very
difficult, if not impossible ... to understand why prison personnel, would not, with full
knowledge that a claimed assault had occmTed by an inmate against a guard, maintain a
recording of the event." R.136. And the judge pointed out that "[m]ore responsible
conduct by the investigative team, and all associated with this event, would preclude such
a motion [to dismiss for destruction of the evidence] and preclude the requirement that
the court attempt to 'divine' what the recording showed." R.137. Ultimately, however,
the court concluded that the failure to preserve the video "amount[ed] to negligence, but
not in a high degree" and decided there was "no culpable conduct by anyone in the
Department of Corrections." R.13 7. The court also did not believe that destruction of the
evidence was "related to any 'decision' made by anyone," and "the reasons for its nonexistence do not support a dismissal." R.135 , 136.
The trial court did not examine in detail the degree of prejudice suffered by
DeJesus, but did indicate that while there would not be any prejudice to DeJesus if the
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recording was consistent with Hansen's testimony, the destruction would be prejudicial if
the video were consistent with DeJesus's claims. R.136. The judge thought, however, that
DeJesus had not shown "any reasonable, believable probability the recording shows what
defendant claims" and it therefore did "not matter why or how it was destroyed." R.136.
The trial court concluded that the reasons for the loss of the video favored the State rather
than dismissal, even though the State was negligent and it was "difficult if not
impossible" to understand why it did not preserve the videotape. The trial court therefore
denied the motion to dismiss. R.135-138.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The State's failure to preserve a video recording that captured the incident which
occurred at the prison violated DeJesus's state due process 1ights and requires dismissal.
The trial court incorrectly required DeJesus to make a threshold showing that the
recording would be exculpatory before conducting the balancing test outlined in

Tiedemann. Neither Tiedemann nor the cases it relied on required such a threshold
showing. Instead, Tiedemann held that a state due process violation occurs when the
factors considered under rule 16 along with the factors considered by other states weigh
in favor of the defendant. Moreover, the threshold requirement adopted by the trial court
works against fundamental fairness and would encourage destruction of evidence since it
is difficult if not impossible to prove the exculpatory content of evidence that has been
destroyed.
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A proper application of the state due process balancing test demonsh·ates that
DeJesus's rights were violated by the destruction of the videotape. All four factors
considered under rule 16 weigh in favor of DeJesus's claim.
First, evidence supported DeJesus's defense that the prosecution's representation
of the incident was inaccurate. Testimony from an inmate along with the guard's
testimony on cross-examination supported DeJesus' s defense that Khan was on the
guard's back and DeJesus was acting to defend herself. Moreover, the State was not
forthcoming about the destruction of the evidence when it responded to DeJesus' s
supplemental discovery motion specifically requesting the recording. Second, the
destruction of the recording left DeJesus without a meaningful opp01iunity to defend
since she was left with the testimony of inmates against that of a guard. Third, the
culpability of the State, which was at least negligent, also works in favor of a due process
violation. The judge recognized that the State was negligent, which alone shows
culpability. But the State' s conduct went beyond mere negligence where neither the
captain nor the investigator took adequate steps to preserve the recording even though the
guard viewed it immediately after the incident and its importance had been identified.
The lack of policies for preserving recordings of prison incidents and the fact that this is
not an isolated event also demonstrate the State's culpability. Finally, DeJesus had no
opportunity or access to the recording or any other means of obtaining similar evidence.
Fmther, although DeJesus was not required to demonstrate a reasonable
probability that the recording would be exculpatory, Tiedemann directs that when a
reasonable probability is demonstrated, comts consider two additional factors- the
11

State's "degree of negligence or culpability" and "the degree of prejudice to the
defendant in light of the materiality and importance of the missing evidence in the
context of the case as a whole, including the strength of the missing evidence."

Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ,144. These factors appear to be aimed at the consequences of a
due process violation rather than its existence. But either way, they work in favor of
dismissal.
First, the trial court imposed too stringent a test when assessing whether there was
a reasonable probability that the evidence would be exculpatory. A reasonable probability
does not require proof that the evidence was in fact exculpatory. Instead, it falls
somewhere between "mere possibility" and "more likely than not" and significantly
below the much more stringent "reasonable certainty." Even under reasonable certainty, a
defendant need not prove that evidence is in fact exculpatory. Instead, courts focus on the
nature of the defense and whether there is evidence from other sources that supp01ts the
defense position. Moreover, fundamental fairness requires that the test not be as stringent
as the trial court required, especially since it is difficult if not impossible to prove the
exculpatory nature of destroyed evidence and too stringent a test would encourage
destruction of the evidence. Here, the nature of the defense and the fact that there was
evidence from an inmate and also testimony from the guard that supp01ted that defense
show that there was a reasonable probability that the recording would be exculpatory.
The type of evidence, the ease with which a permanent recording could have been made,
the fact that the recording captured the incident and was viewed by the guard, the lack of
cumulative evidence, and the fact that the State's case was based only on the guard's
12

testimony, among other things, further demonstrate a reasonable probability that the
recording would be exculpatory.
The prejudice to DeJesus and the State's culpability both weigh in favor of
dismissal. The recording was material and necessary to DeJesus's defense and the State's
conduct went beyond negligence in failing to preserve this critical piece of evidence.
Reversal is therefore required.

ARGUMENT
THE STATE'S FAILURE TO PRESERVE A VIDEOTAPE THAT
RECORDED THE INCIDENT VIOLATED STATE DUE PROCESS.
Aiticle 1, section 7 of Utah's Constitution provides more expansive due process
protection than its federal counterpart when the State fails to preserve evidence.

Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49. This Comt rejected the federal due process approach to
destruction of evidence claims, concluding that a defendant who claims that state due
process was violated by the State's failure to preserve mate1ial evidence is not required to
establish bad faith on the part of the prosecution. Id. (rejecting Arizona v. Youngblood,
488 U.S. 51 (1988)). Instead, for state due process claims, this Court adopted a balancing
"approach under rule 16 [of the Rules of Criminal Procedure]" which makes "the
culpability or bad faith of the state ... only one consideration, not the bright line test."

Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ~41. This balancing of factors is required "on a case-by-case
basis," with "fundamental fairness" as the "touchstone for the balancing process." Id. at
~~44-45.
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In reaching its decision that state due process requires a different test than
federal due process for destruction of evidence claims, this Court recognized that
"[m]any states ... have explored this question under their state due process guarantees"
and have agreed that the focus in loss or destruction of evidence claims is on
"fundamental fairness" instead of whether the State acted in bad faith. Id. (citing

Thorne v. Dep 't. ofPub. Safety, 774 P.2d 1326, 1331 (Alaska 1989); State v. Morales,
657 A.2d 585, 594-95 (Conn. 1995); Hammond v. State, 569 A.2d 81, 87 (Del. 1989);

State v. Matafeo, 787 P.2d 671, 673 (Haw. 1990); Commonwealth v. Henderson, 582
N.E.2d 496, 496-97 (Mass. 1991); State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912,9 14 (Tenn. 1999);

State v. Delisle, 648 A.2d 632, 642-43 (Vt. 1994); State v. Osakalwni, 461 S.E.2d 504,
512 (W.Va. 1995)); see also Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 61 (Stevens, J., concurring). This
Court outlined the balancing approach applicable to claims that destruction of evidence
violates due process under Utah's Constitution, indicating it:
should embrace the basic principles we have adopted under rule 16 and the
factors mentioned by other states. In cases where a defendant has shown a
reasonable probability that lost or destroyed evidence would be
exculpatory, we find it necessary to require consideration of the following:
(1) the reason for the destruction or loss of the evidence, including the
degree of negligence or culpability on the pmt of the State; and (2) the
degree of prejudice to the defendant in light of the materiality and
imp01tance of the missing evidence in the context of the case as a whole,
including the strength of the remaining evidence.

Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, i!44. Based on this passage, one panel of the comt of appeals
and the trial comt in this case misinterpreted Tiedemann to require a threshold showing
by defendants that there is a reasonable probability that the destroyed evidence would be
exculpatory before conducting a balancing test. See State v. Otkovic, 2014 UT App 58,
14

,124, 322 P.2d 746, quoting Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ,144; see also R.132-33 (requiring

defendant to "first demonstrate a 'reasonable probability' that lost or destroyed evidence
would be exculpatory" and concluding DeJesus had not established the requisite
reasonable probability); compare State v. Jackson, 2010 UT App 328, ,1,119-22, 243 P.3d
902 (balancing factors without requiring a threshold showing that evidence had a
reasonable probability of being exculpatory).

1

The trial court's ruling requiring DeJesus to establish a reasonable probability that
the video was exculpatory before conducting the state due process balancing test is
incorrect. R.132-33. The ruling also misapplies the concept of "reasonable probability,"
setting an unreasonably high threshold for criminal defendants who are deprived of
material evidence that is or might be exculpatory. R.1 35. In this case, there was a
reasonable probability that the videotape which filmed the prison incident would be
exculpatory where the guard and an inmate gave testimony that supported the defense
and which was not consistent with the state's depiction. Moreover, the prejudice to
DeJesus caused by the destruction of the video and the culpability of the State in failing
to preserve a videotape that captured the event weigh in favor of dismissal. A correct
application of the balancing test outlined in Tiedemann demonstrates that the State's
1

The court of appeals decided Jackson prior to Otkovic. The decisions are
inconsistent since Otkovic requires a threshold showing of a reasonable probability that
the destroyed evidence would be exculpatory whereas Jackson simply balanced the
factors as required by Tiedemann. See Otkovic, 2014 UT App 58, ,124 (requiring
threshold showing); compare Jackson, 2010 UT App 328, ,1,110, 19-21 (applying a
balancing test to "potentially exculpatory evidence" without requiring a threshold
showing).
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destruction of the videotape violated state due process and requires dismissal of the
charge.

A. The state due process balancing test adopted in Tiedemann does not include
a threshold requirement that the defendant establish a reasonable probability
that the evidence would be exculpatory.
Tiedemann and the other cases this Court relied on in Tiedemann demonstrate that
a defendant is not required to make a threshold showing that destroyed evidence would
be exculpatory before conducting the state due process balancing test. Id. at iJiJ42-44.
Instead, Tiedemann adopted a state due process balancing test based on rule 16 of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and factors considered by other courts. Id. at iJ44.
The State's extensive obligation under rule 16 to provide criminal defendants with
"information possessed by the State to aid their defense" is the starting place in any
inquiry as to whether state due process was violated by the destruction of evidence. Id. at
iJ40. A "prosecutor's good faith ignorance does not excuse non-disclosure" under rule 16.
Id. Instead, courts consider several non-exclusive factors in deciding whether to exclude
evidence based on the State's "failure to fully disclose" evidence. Id. at iJ41. Those nonexclusive factors are:
(1) The extent to which the prosecution's representation [of existing
evidence] is actually inaccurate, (2) the tendency of the omission or
misstatement to lead defense counsel into tactics or strategy that could
prejudice the outcome, (3) the culpability of the prosecutor in omitting the
pertinent information or misstating the facts, and (4) the extent to which
appropriate defense investigation would have discovered the omitted or
misstated evidence.
Id. As Tiedemann indicates, the State has the "broad obligation" to preserve and disclose
evidence when these factors weigh in favor of such disclosure, and the failure to preserve
16
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such evidence violates due process when these factors and those embraced by other states
balance in favor of the defendant. Id. at 1140-41. This test adopted in Tiedemann requires
comis to balance these factors regardless of whether a defendant can demonstrate a
reasonable probability that the destroyed evidence would be exculpatory.
Cases from other states that have adopted a state due process analysis for
destruction of evidence claims also do not require a threshold showing of a reasonable
probability that the evidence would be exculpatory before balancing factors to determine
whether the destruction of evidence violated due process. See id. at 1142-44 (citing cases
adopting state due process analysis). These cases show that this Court did not intend to
impose a high threshold before conducting a balancing test and instead intended to
embrace a balancing test based on fundamental fairness even if the defendant could not
establish that the destroyed evidence was exculpatory. Id.; see Thorne, 774 P.2d at 1331
(balancing the state's culpability, the materiality of the evidence and the prejudice caused
by the destruction of evidence without requiring threshold showing that evidence was
exculpatory); Morales, 657 A.2d at 594-95 (weighing, among other things, the
imp01iance of the evidence, "the reasons for the unavailability of the evidence against the
degree of prejudice to the accused" without requiring threshold showing); Hammond, 569
A.2d at 87-90 (considering the degree of the state's culpability, the imp01iance of
evidence, and the prejudice to accused without requiring defendant to show that
destroyed evidence was in fact exculpatory); Henderson, 582 N.E.2d at 496-97
(balancing "the degree of culpability of the government, the materiality of the evidence,
and the potential prejudice to the defendant" without requiring threshold showing);
17

Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d at 917 (balancing degree of state's negligence, significance of the
evidence, and sufficiency of other evidence without requiring showing that destroyed
evidence was exculpatory); State v. Delisle, 648 A.2d 632, 642-43 (Vt. 1994) (indicating
that courts will consider sanction for destruction of evidence whenever there is a
"reasonable possibility that the lost evidence would be exculpatory," by considering
government's level of negligence or culpability and prejudice to defendant) (emphasis
added); State v. Osakalumi, 461 S.E.2d 504, 512 (W. Va. 1995) (indicating that when the
destroyed evidence would have been subject to disclosure under rule 16 and the state
breached its duty to preserve, consequences are decided based on level of state's
negligence, materiality of the destroyed evidence, and sufficiency of remaining
evidence).
Rather than requiring a threshold showing that the evidence would be exculpatory
before conducting a state due process balancing test, these other cases recognize that the
state due process test applies when the destroyed evidence is only "potentially
exculpatory." See, e.g., Morales, 657 A.2d at 595; Hammond, 569 A.2d at 87;

Henderson, 582 N.E.2d at 497; Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912; Delisle, 648 A.2d at 642-44;
Osakalumi, 461 S.E.2d at 512. This concern for the destruction of potentially exculpatory
evidence in other state due process cases is consistent with this Court's recognition in

Tiedemann that the issue before it was "[w]hether the State's destruction ofpotentially
exculpatory evidence" violated state due process. Id. at ,r12 (emphasis added). In fact,
these other cases recognize that where the claim is based on the State's failure to preserve
evidence, defendants ordinarily will have difficulty establishing that the evidence was in
18
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fact exculpatory since the evidence no longer exists. See, e.g., Morales, 657 A.2d at 589;
Thorne, 774 P.2d at 1330-31; Delisle, 648 A.2d at 643; Hammond, 569 A.2d at 87. This

recognition that defendants ordinarily will not be able to establish the exculpatory value
of destroyed evidence further demonstrates that the cases do not treat a defendant's
inability to prove exculpatory value as 1igid ba1Tier to thoughtful balancing.
Instead of requiring a threshold showing of exculpatory value, these other cases
conduct balancing tests to determine whether the destruction of evidence violated state
due process. For example, in Thorne, the comi applied a balancing test in deciding
whether destruction of a videotape of field sob1iety tests (FST's) violated the defendant's
right to due process and a meaningful opportunity to be heard at a driver's license hearing
following a DUI arrest. 774 P.2d at 1330-31. The court recognized that "considerations of
fundamental fairness dictate that where the burden of preservation is so slight, evidence
being potentially relevant to an issue of central imp01iance at a revocation proceeding
should be preserved." Id. at 1330. It pointed out that the government's "good or bad
faith" is not dispositive, and that where the evidence has been destroyed, the focus is on
whether the destroyed evidence would have played a meaningful role. Id. Because the
destroyed videotape of FST's "might have led the jury to ente1iain a reasonable doubt" if
it showed the defendant performing the well, it was of central importance to the hearing.
Id. The court concluded that "where the burden of preservation is so minimal, and the

evidence is of even slight potential relevance, the state bears a heavy burden in justifying
its destruction." Id. at 1131. Because the state had "not borne its burden," the court
concluded that destruction of the evidence violated due process. Id.
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In Morales, the court balanced various factors which included "the materiality of
the missing evidence, the likelihood of mistaken interpretation of it by witnesses or the
jury, the reason for its nonavailability to the defense and the prejudice to the defendant
caused by the unavailability...." Morales, 657 A.2d at 593. There, the court concluded
that the defendant's due process rights were violated by the State's loss of potentially
exculpatory evidence-a jacket with semen stains that would have absolved the
defendant if the stains were tested and shown not to have been deposited by the
defendant. Id. at 593-95.
And, in Delaware, courts examine the claim that loss or destruction of evidence
violated state due process under the following test:
1) would the requested material, if extant in the possession of the State at
the time of the defense request, have been subject to disclosure under
Criminal Rule 16 or Brady? 2
2) if so, did the government have a duty to preserve the material?
3) if there was a duty to preserve, was the duty breached, and what
consequences would flow from the breach?
Hammond, 569 A.2d at 86. If there has been the breach of a duty to preserve, Delaware
employs another three-pait test to detennine the consequences of that breach: "(l) the
degree of negligence or bad faith involved, (2) the impo1tance of the missing evidence
considering the probative value and reliability of secondary or substitute evidence that
remains available, and (3) the sufficiency of other evidence produced at the tiial to
sustain the conviction." Id.; see also Ferguson, 2 S.W. 3d at 917. These factors

2

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)
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considered by other states further demonstrate that a defendant is not required to establish
a reasonable probability that the destroyed evidence would be exculpatory before
conducting the state due process balancing test.
Moreover, fundamental fairness is not served by a test that relieves a comt from
thoughtful balancing whenever a defendant fails to establish the exculpatory value of the
missing evidence. In other words, a defendant's rights under state due process are not
adequately protected by a "litmus test" that turns on the defendant's ability to satisfy a
nearly unattainable burden. Morales, 657 A.2d at 592; see also Low v. City ofMonticello,
2004 UT 90, 'i[15, 103 P.3d 130 ("Due process is not a rigid concept."). Making the test
contingent on a defendant's ability to show exculpatory value could also "have the
unfortunate effect of encouraging the destruction of evidence to the extent that evidence
destroyed becomes merely 'potentially useful' since its contents would be unprovable."

Thorne, 774 P.2d at 1331 n.9.
Instead of requiring a threshold showing as to the exculpatory value of the
destroyed evidence, "[t]he application of due process requires a thorough analysis of the
circumstances and facts paiticular to a case." Kennon v. Air Quality Bd., 2009 UT 77,
'i[29, 270 P.3d 417; see also Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, 'i[42 (citing cases that recognize that
"fundamental fairness," as an element of due process, "requires that the State's failure to
preserve evidence that could be favorable to the defendant be evaluated in the context of
the entire record.") (citation omitted). Thus, "[r]ather than allow a State's ineptitude to
saddle a defendant with an impossible burden, a court should focus on the type of
evidence, the possibility it might prove exculpatory, and the existence of other evidence
21

going to the same point of contention in determining whether the failure to preserve the
evidence in question violated due process." Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 69 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). Hence, Tiedemann and fundamental fairness require "some balancing . .. on
a case-by-case basis" of the nonexclusive rule 16 factors and the factors utilized by other
states regardless of whether a defendant can show exculpatory value. 2007 UT 49, i]44.
Moreover, the state due process protection for destruction of evidence claims
would not have any significance if defendants were required to establish a threshold
showing of the exculpatory nature of the evidence. Aside from the difficulty in
establishing that evidence is exculpatory when the evidence has been destroyed, the
protection would add little where the exculpatory value was established since federal due
process othe1wise requires that the State disclose exculpatory evidence. See Brady v.

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984). In fact,
Utah law recognizes that "[i]n criminal prosecutions, the State has two independent
obligations to provide evidence to the defense." State v. Kallin, 877 P.2d 138, 143 (Utah
1994). The first duty, based on federal due process, is "to provide, without request by the
defendant, all exculpatory evidence." Id. This duty requires the State to provide all
evidence "which is or may be exculpatory." State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 850 (Utah
1988) (emphasis added). Since due process already required the State to preserve and
disclose evidence to the defense that is or may be exculpatory, the state due process
protection outlined in Tiedemann would add nothing to the analysis if defendants had to
establish that the evidence was exculpatory in order to consider whether state due process
was violated by the destruction of the evidence, while at the same time "encouraging the
22
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desh·uction of[exculpatory] evidence." Thorne, 774 P.2d at 1331 n.9. This further
demonstrates that the trial comi's threshold requirement that DeJesus establish the
exculpatory value of the missing videotape was incon-ect.

Tiedemann, cases from other states cited in Tiedemann, and fundamental fairness
all show that the trial court incon-ectly required DeJesus to establish the exculpatory
nature of the destroyed videotape before conducting a balancing test to determine
whether state due process was violated. See R.132-33. Because the trial comi inc01rectly
required this threshold showing and did not balance the rule 16 and other factors based on
its determination that DeJesus had not established the exculpatory nature of the evidence
(R.132-35), the trial court's ruling should be reversed.
B. Proper application of the state due process balancing test establishes that the
state's destruction of the videotape of the alleged incident violates due
process.
Rather than requiring a threshold showing that the destroyed evidence was
exculpatory, Tiedemann directs h·ial comis to consider the rule 16 factors and the factors
considered by other states when evaluating a motion to dismiss based on destruction of
evidence. 2007 UT 49, ,r,r4I, 44. Additionally,
"[i]n cases where a defendant has shown a reasonable probability that lost or
destroyed evidence would be exculpatory, [this Court found] it necessary to
require consideration of the following: (1) the reason for the destruction or loss of
the evidence, including the degree of negligence or culpability on the part of the
State and (2) the degree of prejudice to the defendant in light of the materiality and
importance of the missing evidence in the context of the case as a whole, including
the strength of the remaining evidence."

Id. at if44. Fundamental fairness guides the balancing process. Id. at ,I45.
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In this case, the trial court incorrectly required a threshold showing that there was
a reasonable probability that the evidence was exculpatory, and erroneously determined
that it was not required to analyze the factors listed in Tiedemann. R.135. Moreover,
although the trial court ultimately considered the reason for the destruction, including the
culpability of the state in case it was "wrong about the exculpatory nature of the
recording," it failed to consider the rule 16 factors and its analysis of the State's
culpability and the prejudice to DeJesus was deficient. R. 135-38. Correctly analyzed,
these factors demonstrate that the State's destruction of the videotape of the incident
violated state due process, requiring dismissal.

l. The rule 16 factors, which were not considered by the trial court,
demonstrate that the destruction of the videotape violated state due
process.
"It is a matter of clear Utah law that criminal defendants are entitled to
infonnation possessed by the State to aid in their defense." Id. at i/40. This Court has
recognized that under rule 16, prosecutors have "broad obligations ... to produce" and
disclose evidence, and has "identified several factors under rule 16 to guide a trial court's
decision on a motion to exclude prosecution evidence because of a failure to fully
disclose." Id. at i!i/40 ( citation omitted). "These factors are also relevant to a motion, like
the one here, to dismiss charges for destruction of evidence." Id. The non-exclusive rule
16 factors are:
(1) The extent to which the prosecution's representation [of the existing
evidence] is actually inaccurate, (2) the tendency of the omission or
misstatement to lead defense counsel into tactics or strategy that could
prejudice the outcome, (3) the culpability of the prosecutor in omitting
pertinent information or misstating facts, and (4) the extent to which
24
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appropriate defense investigation would have discovered the omitted or
misstated evidence.

Id., citing Kallin, 877 P.2d at 143; see also Jackson, 2010 UT App 328, 120 (recognizing
that "[w]hen evaluating a motion to dismiss based on destrnction of evidence, courts
should consider the 'nonexclusive factors' outlined in rnle 16 ... ").
As DeJ esus argued below, the comt was "required to consider the rnle 16 factors
regardless of whether there is a showing that the evidence is exculpatory," and "a
balancing of the rule 16 factors weighs in favor of dismissal." R.94-95.
The first factor- "the extent to which the prosecution's representation [of the
existing evidence] is actually inaccurate"- weighs in favor of disclosure. Although
Hansen testified at the evidentiary hearing that the recording showed that Khan was 4-6
feet behind him and "backing off' (R.175:3, 4-5), he had previously testified at the
preliminary hearing that Khan was "on my back, I don't know exactly where she was"
but "she was no longer on my shoulder." R. 70-71. Hansen attempted to explain these
inconsistencies during the evidentiary hearing by saying that he meant that he did not
know where Khan was while the incident was occmTing, but he later viewed the
recording and saw that she was a few feet back. Rl 75:5. Although the judge accepted
Hansen's explanation, the explanation did not clarify why he would have testified that
Khan was on his back if she were a few feet behind him. The guard's testimony that
Khan was on his back supp01ts the defense and is consistent with Ataata's testimony that
Khan did not disengage, that she was behind Hansen, and that "she was right there on his
back the whole time." R.175:18-19. These inconsistencies in the guard's testimony
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support DeJesus's defense and indicate that the prosecution's depiction of the incident is
inaccurate. 3
Moreover, the fact that the defense was not consistent with the prosecution's
representation of what occmTed further demonstrates that the first rule 16 factor weighs
in favor of dismissal. Ataata testified, consistent with the defense, that Khan was right
behind the officer "and reaching toward defendant and trying to strike defendant when
she hit Hansen." R.132. She also testified that Khan "was right there on [Hansen's] back
the whole time." R.175: 19. Because Ataata had a close relationship with DeJesus, the
judge decided to disregard her testimony. R.132. But Ataata's testimony was to some
extent consistent with Hansen's testimony at the preliminary hearing that Khan was on
his back. And, regardless of how the judge felt about Ataata's credibility, DeJesus was
entitled to have her defense presented to a jury who would make relevant findings. The
fact that there was evidence indicating that the officer's representation of the event was
not accurate points out not only the importance of the video to this case but also weighs
in favor of finding a state due process violation.
Additionally, the State responded to DeJesus's supplemental discovery request,
stating, "[t]he State is unable to provide any video of the incident as none exist (sic) as
per the Utah State Prison." R.117. This response failed to accurately infonn DeJesus that
the incident had been recorded, that Hansen had viewed the recording shortly after the

3

The trial court's finding that "[t]he only possible evidence [of the recording's
exculpatory value . .. [wa]s the testimony of Ataata" is clearly e1Toneous. The guard's
testimony that Khan was on his back, though later refuted, also demonstrated the
potential exculpatory value of the recording. R.70, 134.

26

incident, and that the recording had subsequently been destroyed. This representation of
the evidence was also inaccurate, weighing in Dejesus's favor.
The second factor also weighs in DeJesus's favor. The unavailability of the
recording completely changed the defense's approach to this case. Because the State's
evidence was based on the testimony of a prison guard and the judge had already
indicated that he did not consider Ataata credible, this case resolved in a Sery plea instead
of a trial. Indeed, the video provided the most accurate evidence of what actually
transpired and was critical because the testimony of a convicted felon may carry very
little weight against that of a prison guard. See Pettit v. Smith, 45 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1111
(D. Ariz. 2014) (recognizing that testimony of a convicted felon and other inmates does
not carry the same weight against the testimony of uniformed guards as does a video of a
prison incident, and pointing out the imp01tance of a video in "potentially assist[ing] the
jury to understand the tenor of the event and to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses
who are providing conflicting descriptions."); see also Morales, 657 A.2d at 593 ('"Of
course, there is the additional difficulty of proving that the police knew the evidence to be
exculpatory. Few officers will be willing to admit they desh·oyed evidence they knew to
be exculpatory."'). Had the video been preserved, DeJesus could have taken her case to a
jury that would not have been "forced to rely on the conclusions drawn by the various
witnesses" as to what occurred, and instead would have been able to form their own
conclusions. Pettit, 45 F. Supp. at 1111. This second rule 16 factor-whether the
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destruction led the defense into a strategy that prejudiced the outcome- therefore also
weighs in favor of a state due process violation.
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Third, the State had a significant degree of culpability not only in omitting
pertinent information in its discovery response but also in destroying the video. The trial

•

court recognized that the State was negligent but thought the negligence was "not in a
high degree." R.13 7. While mere negligence is enough to show culpability, the trial
comi's diminution of the State's negligence is incorrect because it went beyond mere
negligence for the State to have allowed the footage to be destroyed. People v. Handy,
988 N.E.2d 879, 882-83 (N.Y. 2013). When a recording captures events surrounding an
offense, the State has an obligation to preserve that video and "take whatever steps are
necessary to insure that the video will not be erased-whether by simply taking a tape or
disc out of a machine, or by instructing a computer not to delete the material." Id. "In
view of the importance of the video recordings, it [goes] beyond mere negligence for the
[State] ... not to have adequate safeguards in place for protection of the recordings."
Peschel v. City OfMissoula, 664 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1146-47 (D. Mont. 2009) (concluding
that city's failure to preserve video recording of incident that was recorded on police
car's video camera was reckless). 4
In this case, the video was not available by the time the case was filed and counsel
appointed. "No one, in sh01i, knows if in fact a hard recording was made but no one
4

Prosecutors are not the only state agents charged with preserving and producing
potentially exculpatory evidence. In fact, "[i]nformation known to police officers
working on a case is charged to the prosecution since the officers are paii of the
prosecution team." State v. Shabala, 678 P.2d 785, 788 (Utah 1984). "Neither the
prosecutor nor officers working on a case may withhold exculpatory evidence or
evidence valuable to a defendant." Id.; State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 918 n.5 (Utah
1987). Likewise, information known to state correctional officers and investigators is
chai·ged to the prosecution.

•
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claims it exists." R.131. But Hansen viewed the video immediately after the incident.
R.175:2. He wrote a report and turned it into his supervisor, the captain, who repmted the
incident to the investigations unit. R.175:8-9. The investigations unit contacted Hansen
that same day. R.175:9. Either the captain or the investigator could have asked "for a
burned DVD from this digital recording." R.175:10. The investigator requested a copy of
the video from the officer in the control room, but could not remember the officer's name
and said "she was new." R.172:3 , 6-8. Although the image remained for thirty days
before being destroyed, the investigator did not follow-up on obtaining the recording
until more than thi1ty days later. R.172:5. Even during the follow-up, the investigator did
not name whom she had talked to and could not remember when she requested the
recording. The investigator remembered that she was sent to the captain, who told the
investigator that if a hard copy of the recording had been made, it had been lost. R.172:3,
6, 8. The fact that the recording captured the incident and had been viewed by Hansen,
along with the failure of prison personnel to ensure that a permanent recording was made
and the failure to follow-up in a timely manner, demonstrate that the State's culpability
went beyond mere negligence.
In addition, the State's degree of culpability is further heightened by its failure to
implement controls and policies that ensure preservation of video recordings capturing
offenses in the prison. As the investigator testified, the prison has no policies regarding
the retention of video surveillance evidence. R.172:2. Video recordings offer the best
evidence of what occmTed, are critical to the preparation of a defense, are routinely
requested as part of discovery, and should be preserved and disclosed to a defendant.
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When video recordings of an alleged crime are not preserved, a defendant can have
difficulty defending against the testimony of guards. Moreover, the destruction of this
type of evidence can raise at least an inference that it must not have suppo1ted the State's
case, thereby undennining the integrity of our system if the prosecution goes fo1ward
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without the destroyed evidence. See Handy, 988 N.E.2d at 883.
For these reasons, the State should have policies in place to retain recordings that
capture offenses occmTing in prison. Peschel, 664 F. Supp. 2d at 1146-47 (where the city
"utterly failed to have any controls in place to ensure the video recordings from police
vehicles were adequately preserved," its actions "went beyond mere negligence"); see
also Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212,218 (S.D.N.Y.2003) ("Once a
paity reasonably anticipates litigation, it must suspend its routine document
retention/destruction policy and put in place a 'litigation hold' to ensure the preservation
ofrelevant documents"). The lack of policies and procedures is evident not only from the
investigator's testimony, but also from the mishandling of this imp01tant piece of
evidence and fmther demonstrates the State's culpability.
The trial court acknowledged that the State was negligent, but thought it was not
"neglige[nt] in a high degree," because the State's failure to preserve the video was "born
out of a multitude of factors and the fact that many personnel are involved in a setting
such as a prison control unit." R.137. But the fact that "many personnel are involved"
emphasizes the need for policies and controls regarding the retention or destruction of
videos that record an alleged crime. Further, as the tiial court indicated, it is "difficult, if
not impossible" to understand why the State did not preserve the recording. R.136. And,
30
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as the comi pointed out, it would be more likely for the recording to be preserved if it
c01Toborated Hansen's testimony and more likely to be destroyed if it did not. R.136. The
State's failure to preserve this material evidence along with its failure to adopt policies
for preserving this type of evidence highlights the State's culpability and shows that it
went beyond "mere negligence." Moreover, the destruction of a recording of an incident
at the prison is not an isolated event as evidenced by the fact that the video of a prison
incident that gave rise to criminal charges was also destroyed in another case before this
Court, State v. Mohamud, Case No. 20120844-SC. See People v. Sweeney, 859 N.Y.S.2d
898, 2008 WL 451436 at *5 (Albany City Ct. 2008) (unpublished) ("In order to assess
the degree of[] fault [with regard to the State's failure to preserve discoverable
evidence], the Court must consider the fact that this case is not an isolated incident.").
The third rule 16 factor, the culpability of the State, weighs heavily in favor of a due
process violation.
And finally, the fourth rule 16 factor- whether the defense investigation would
have changed the outcome-weighs in favor of a due process violation. The charges in
this case were not filed until several months after the incident; by then, the video had
been destroyed. Prison surveillance footage is a unique fom1 of evidence that is under the
State's control. A defendant cannot discover or obtain surveillance footage on her own if
the State destroys it. In this case, the guard looked at the video shortly after the incident;
at that point, the importance of the video had already been identified. The investigator
also recognized that the video was impo1iant and requested it. The defendant, on the other
hand, had no access to the video, no ability to create her own video, and no way to obtain
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the video once charges had been filed. Hence, defense investigation would not have
changed the outcome.
All of the rule 16 factors therefore demonstrate that the State was required to
preserve and disclose the video recording of the alleged incident, and that its failure to do
so violated state due process. As DeJesus argued below, these factors alone demonstrate
that the State's failure to preserve material evidence to which DeJesus was entitled under
rule 16 violated due process. R.96; see Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (reversing where prosecutor
violated rule 16 in failing to provide inculpatory evidence to the defense); see also
Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49,144.
2. The record shows that there is a reasonable probability the destroyed
video recording would be exculpatory.

Although DeJesus need not demonstrate "a reasonable probability that lost or
destroyed evidence would be exculpatory" as a threshold or for reversal, when a
defendant does demonstrate a reasonable probability that destroyed evidence would be
exculpatory, two additional factors are considered. See Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, 144.
These factors are: "(1) the reason for the destruction or loss of the evidence, including the
degree of negligence or culpability on the part of the State; and (2) the degree of
prejudice to the defendant in light of the materiality and imp01iance of the missing
evidence in the context of the case as a whole, including the strength of the remaining
evidence." Id. The trial comi erred by interpreting "reasonable probability" to require a
defendant to present extrinsic proof that the video was in fact exculpatory, thereby
incorporating a standard that is stricter than due process allows, and in disregarding the
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nature of the defense and the evidence presented by the defense in determining whether
there was a reasonable probability that the video "would be exculpatory." Id. The trial
court's ruling that DeJesus did not establish a reasonable probability that the recording
would be exculpatory (R. 135, 133-38) is incorrect.

5

5

Tiedemann indicates that a state due process violation based on destruction of
evidence can be found based only on a balancing of the rule 16 factors. The second part
of the test outlined in Tiedemann-whether the defendant demonstrated "a reasonable
probability that lost or destroyed evidence would be exculpatory," and a balancing of the
two additional factors-seems aimed more towards the consequences of the due process
violation rather than whether a due process violation occurred. See Tiedemann, 2007 UT
49, '1!44. Such an approach is consistent with the approach taken by other courts that
conduct a two-part state due process balancing test. The first part assesses whether the
government violated due process in not preserving and disclosing the evidence whereas
the second part assesses the consequences of the violation. See, e.g. Hammond, 569 A.2d
at 86 ( determining that government breached its duty to preserve evidence then
considering the culpability of the government, the importance of the evidence, and the
existence of cumulative evidence in determining the consequences of the breach);
Thorne, 774 P.2d at 1331-32 (concluding that State's failure to preserve videotape of
field sob1iety tests violated due process then "look[ing] to the degree of culpability on the
pati of the state, the importance of the evidence lost, the prejudice suffered by the
accused, and the evidence of guilt adduced at the trial or hearing" in determining the
appropriate consequence); Morales, 657 A.2d at 728 (indicating that remedy for due
process violation is fashioned to "serve the interests of justice" and depends on "the
materiality of the unpreserved evidence and the degree of prejudice to the accused"); see
also United States v. Miranda, 526 F.2d 1319 (2nd Cir. 1975) ("Where disclosable
evidentiary material which came into the possession of the Government has been lost or
destroyed, and is unavailable to the defense for that reason, the standards for determining
whether sanctions should be imposed on the Government ... depend on the extent of the
Government's culpability for the loss or destruction and the amount of the prejudice to
the defense which resulted."). But regardless of whether the second pati of the
Tiedemann test applies to consequences or provides additional factors for determining
whether state due process was violated, the term "reasonable probability" could not have
been meant to require a defendant to actually prove that the destroyed evidence was
exculpatory in order to obtain relief because, among other things, such a requirement
would be difficult if not impossible to meet and would obviate the state due process
protection.
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When evidence is destroyed before a defendant is afforded the opp01iunity to
examine it, a defendant is precluded from proving its exculpatory content. See Delisle,
648 A.2d at 643; Thorne, 774 P.2d at 1331; Hammond, 569 A.2d at 87. "When evidence
has been lost or remains untested 'there is often no way for a defendant to ascertain the
true extent of its exculpatory nature."' State v. Bailey, 475 A.2d 1045, 1050 (Vt. 1984).
Thus, rather than requiring a higher quantum of proof, which would preclude most
defendants from meeting their initial burden and relieve comis from their balancing

•

duties, fundamental fairness requires a low initial burden that encourages thoughtful
balancing. See id. (concluding that "when evidence is not available a defendant does not
have to prove the evidence would be exculpatory but must show only a 'reasonable
possibility' that it would have been favorable" (emphasis added)).
This Court has already recognized that "[b]ecause of the difficulties posed by the
record's silence in cases involving a wrongful failure to disclose inculpatory evidence, it
seems appropriate in such instances to place the burden on the State to persuade a court
that the error did not unfairly prejudice the defense." Knight 734 P.2d at 921 (emphasis
added). Hence, even if the videotape were inculpatory, the State would have had an
obligation under Knight and rule 16 to preserve and disclose it. Failure to do so would
have required the State to persuade the court that failure to disclose the video "did not
unfairly prejudice the defense." Id. Requiring the defendant to actually prove the
exculpatory nature of the video is thus inconsistent with Knight, misreads Tiedemann,
and would do away with the state due process protection.
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The difficulties of establishing that destroyed evidence was in fact exculpatory
show that the trial court's stringent requirement that DeJesus prove that the video was
exculpatory misinterpreted this Court's use of the term "reasonable probability" in

Tiedemann. A "reasonable probability" is not an actuality or even a reasonable certainty.
See Knight, 734 P.2d at 919-20. Instead, " '[a] reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.'" Id. at 920 (citation omitted). Utah
cases law make it clear that a reasonable probability occurs "at some point substantially
short of the 'more probable than not' portion of the spectrum," Knight, 734 P.2d at 920,
and therefore does not require proof that the destroyed evidence was in fact exculpatory.
Utah appellate comis have recognized that the reasonable probability test does not
require a defendant to prove that it is "more likely than not" that the destroyed evidence
contains exculpatory evidence. See State v. Blake, 2002 UT 113, i]20, 63 P.3d 56; see

also Worthen, 2008 UT App 23 at i]28. The reasonable probability test "elude[s]
quantification" and its precise limits cannot be defined, but this Comi has articulated its
place relative to that of other standards. Blake, 2002 UT l 13,i]20. So while this standard
is elusive, we know that "reasonable probability" falls "somewhere between 'mere
possibility' and 'more likely than not" and that it falls significantly below "reasonable
certainty." Id.
By contrast with "reasonable probability," "reasonable certainty," which "lies on
the more stringent side of 'more likely than not,"' is deliberately chosen for specific
circumstances where there is a need for more stringent proof. Blake, 2002 UT 113, i]20.
But even when the much more stringent "reasonable certainty" test is applied, our case
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law does not require absolute proof that the evidence is exculpatory, as was required by
the trial comt here. Instead, our case law recognizes that despite the imposition of the
stringent "reasonable ce1tainty" test, a defendant can show that there is a reasonable
certainty that therapy records include exculpatory evidence by alleging specific facts
rather than generalizations and by providing "infom1ation from outside sources" that
might supp01t the defense. Blake, 2002 UT 113, i122; Worthen, 2008 UT App 23, i128.
For example, the defendant in Worthen met the more stringent reasonable ce1tainty
test by identifying the focus of his defense and providing "information from outside
sources" that suppo1ted that defense. Id. at ili128-30. Rather than requiring absolute proof
of the exculpatory content of the records to establish a reasonable certainty, the court
focused on the nature of the defense and reasoned that the defendant had established a
reasonable ce1tainty that the records contained exculpatory evidence where the defense
alleged that the victim made up the criminal allegations because she hated her parents,
the request contained specific dates of therapy sessions, and the victim's mother claimed
to be present for at least one session. Id. at ,i,i29-30. Hence, under an even more stringent
"reasonable certainty" standard, a defendant can establish a reasonable certainty that
exculpatory evidence exists without actually proving that the evidence is exculpatory.

Blake, 2002 UT 113, i122; see also State v. Cardall, 1999 UT 51, 982 P.2d 79 (holding
that defendant demonstrated a reasonable certainty that records contained exculpatory
evidence in light of the focus of the defense and information from outside sources
supporting the defense).
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Even when the more stiingent "reasonable certainty" test is employed, a trial judge
does not weigh the evidence or assess credibility in deciding whether the defendant has
shown a reasonable certainty that records contain exculpatory evidence. See, e.g., id.
Instead, our courts have looked to the nature of the defense and specific "information
from outside sources" in reaching a decision that the defendant has established a
reasonable certainty that records contained exculpatory evidence. Cardall, 1999 UT 51,
il30. The application of the "reasonable certainty" test in these cases further demonstrates
that in this case, the trial court erred in applying a heightened test to its "reasonable
probability" determination that disregarded the focus of the defense; disregarded or
disbelieved "information from outside sources," including testimony of defense witnesses
and inconsistent testimony from the guard; and disregarded the circumstances of the case.
Proper application of a "reasonable probability" standard shows that the trial court
erred in concluding that DeJesus did not show a reasonable probability that the recording
would be evidence. At the very least, the focus of the defense and "information from
outside sources" should be considered because they can establish the more stringent
reasonable certainty. See Blake, 2002 UT 113, il22. It also makes sense to consider "the
type of evidence and the available technology, as well as the circumstances of the case,"
and whether no equivalent form of evidence exists when assessing whether there is a
reasonable probability that the destroyed evidence was exculpatory. Youngblood, 488
U.S. at 71 (Blackmun, J. , dissenting).
Moreover, some courts entertain a presumption when circumstances waiTant it that
the lost or destroyed evidence would have been favorable to the defense. See, e.g.,
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Thorne, 774 P.2d at 1331-32 (remanding with directions that hearing officer presume that
the destroyed videotape would have been favorable to the defendant). This is consistent
with the trial court's recognition that a videotape of an alleged incident in the prison is
more likely to be destroyed if it is inconsistent with the testimony of the state's witness.
R.135-36. Hence, in determining whether there is a reasonable probability that the
destroyed evidence would be exculpatory, courts should also consider whether the
circumstances create an inference that the lost or destroyed evidence would have been
favorable to the defense.
Application of these factors demonstrates that the trial court was inc01Tect in
concluding that there was no showing of a reasonable probability that the videotape of the
incident would be exculpatory. First, the defense focused on the location of Khan dming
the incident; the trial court depicted the defense as, "the striking of Hansen was either an
accident while defendant was trying to engage in combat with Khan or that the striking
was justified or occmTed for some reason other than as claimed by Hansen that it was
done to inflict injury intentionally or knowingly." R.134. The video would have shown
whether the defense claim that Khan was directly behind Hansen and engaging in
aggressive behavior was accurate.
Information from outside sources further demonsh·ates that there is a reasonable
probability that the video would be exculpatory. See supra at 36-37. As previously
outlined, Ataata observed the incident and testified consistently with DeJesus's defense
that Khan was on Hansen's back, trying to swing at DeJesus, and did not back away.
R.175:17-19. At least part of Hansen's testimony was also consistent with DeJesus's
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defense since he testified that Khan was on his back. R.70. This testimony from outside
sources that was consistent with DeJesus's defense demonstrates that there was a
reasonable probability that the video would be exculpatory.
Although the trial judge gave "little credit" to Ataata's testimony and indicated
that he did not find the testimony believable (R.134), that was not the proper inquiry. In
fact, the judge recognized that that "[a] jury may well conclude differently," that the
"court's belief at this point is of course irrelevant to what may be presented at trial," and
that "[t]he court is not indicating such evidence cannot be presented by the defendant at a
trial." R.135. In fact, the comi was correct that its belief was irrelevant since it was for
the jury, not the court, to decide who to believe in light of the conflicting evidence about
the incident. Moreover, DeJesus had the right to present a meaningful defense and
Ataata's testimony, coupled with the recording of the incident, would have been the way
in which she presented her defense had the State preserved the video as required.
Nevertheless, the comi entirely discounted Ataata's testimony without recognizing that
other sources corroborated the defense and emphasized the importance of the video since
it would have shown definitively who was accurately describing the incident. Just as the
judge in Worthen could not discount the information from other sources that supported
the defense in assessing whether there was a reasonable ce1iainty that the records
contained exculpatory evidence, this trial judge could not make credibility detem1inations
and instead should have been focusing simply on the nature of the defense and whether
there was information from other sources in deciding whether there was a reasonable
probability that the video contained info1mation favorable to the defense.
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The existence of this specific evidence supporting the defense from two different
sources, coupled with the focus of the defense, shows that this evidence was sufficient to
establish the more stringent reasonable ce1iainty standard outlined in Carda!!, Blake, and
other cases. Since that standard is much higher, requiring that the existence of
exculpatory evidence be more probable than not, the focus of the defense and the
existence of specific evidence supporting that defense met the lower reasonable
probability standard.
Although this should be enough to establish a reasonable probability, there is more
in this case. The type of evidence destroyed, the availability of technology and the ease
with which the video could have been preserved, the fact that the video was in the State's
possession and was viewed by the guard, and the fact that it depicted the incident and was
not cumulative all fmiher demonstrate the need for this evidence as well as that there was
more than a "mere possibility" that the evidence was exculpatory.
The video was mate1ial and critical to this case-it directly filmed the incident and
would have provided definitive evidence regarding the factual questions that existed. It
would have been simple to preserve. It is "difficult, if not impossible" to understand why
the prison would not maintain a pennanent recording of the incident. R.136. In fact,
"[t]he destruction came about by action or inaction, of the Department of Corrections
personnel in failing to preserve evidence that was readily available at the time of the
incident." R.135. The evidence was not cumulative and no other evidence of this nature
was available. And, the destruction of the video had a "pervasive" effect on this case. See
generally State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14, ,r86, 152 P.3d 321 (recognizing that there is a
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reasonable probability that an en-or affected the outcome of a trial where the error is
pervasive). Moreover, as some courts have recognized, the destruction of evidence
material to the case raises at least an inference that it must have been favorable to the
defense. Similarly, the trial court in this case recognized that "[i]f the recording showed
exactly as Hansen said, ce1tainly it would seem to the comt that common sense would
indicate that recording would be retained," but "if the recording supported some other
factual situation than the one Hansen describes," it would be more likely to be destroyed.
R.135-36. All of these considerations combine to establish more than a "mere possibility"
that the recording would be exculpatory. The trial court therefore e1Ted in concluding that
DeJesus did not demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that the recording
would be exculpatory.
3.

The reason for the destruction and the prejudice to DeJesus require
that this case be dismissed.

In cases like this "where a defendant has shown a reasonable probability that lost
or destroyed evidence would be exculpatory, ... it [is] necessary to require consideration
of the following: (1) the reason for the destruction or loss of the evidence, including the
degree of negligence or culpability on the part of the State; and (2) the degree of
prejudice to the defendant in light of the materiality and impmtance of the missing
evidence in the context of the case as a whole, including the strength of the remaining
evidence." Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, if44. While these factors demonstrate that state due
process was violated, they also show that dismissal is required. See supra at 33 n.5.; see

also Morales, 657 A.2d at 728-29 (indicating that consequences of state due process

41

violation are guided by the interests of justice and depend on the prejudice to defendant
caused by the destruction of evidence). Ultimately, if it would be fundamentally unfair to
try the defendant without the missing evidence, dismissal is required. Ferguson, 2
S.W.2d at 917.
1.

The video was both material and important to DeJesus's defense, and
the state's destruction of the video was prejudicial.

The State's destruction of the surveillance video prejudiced DeJesus and precluded
her from presenting a meaningful defense. See Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, if44. "[B]y its
very nature," video footage is "unique" and important. State v. Merriman, 410 S.W.3d
779, 792-93 (Tenn. 2013); Catlett v. State, 585 P.2d 553, 558 n. 5 (Alaska 1978)
("[P]reservation of photographs and other real evidence is of special importance to
defense preparation."). Video recordings are the best evidence of the circumstances
sunounding the offense and the events that unfolded. Videos offer an objective account
of the events, unmaned by the fading memories and biases of witnesses. When a case is
based on testimonial evidence alone, video recordings play a vital role and the video's
loss may be particularly prejudicial. See Merriman, 410 S.W.3d at 792-93 (indicating that
the defendant was denied his right to a fair tlial where the destroyed "video was a
recording of the alleged offenses as they occurred, was probative of the issues
smTounding [the] ... charges, and was the only non-testimonial evidence"). By contrast
if the video "would have been merely cumulative" of other evidence the defendant may
suffer little prejudice. Morales, 657 A.2d at 727.
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Here, the surveillance footage was material and imp01tant to DeJesus's defense
and its loss significantly prejudiced her. The trial court discounted the degree of
prejudice, curs01ily explaining that "[b]ecause ... defendant has [not] shown any
reasonable, believable probability the recording showed what defendant claims," there
would be no "prejudice by its unavailability." R.136. This failed to consider the
impo1tance of the video and its centrality to the issue of guilt in this case.

In order to convict, the jury had to find that DeJesus "commit[ted] assault,
intending to cause bodily injury." Utah Code §76-5-102.5; see also Utah Code §76-5-102
However, DeJesus would be entitled to an acquittal if she did not intend to cause the
guard bodily injury or "reasonably believed" that force was necessary to defend herself
against Khan's "imminent use of unlawful force." See Utah Code §76-2-402; Com. v.
Fowlin, 676 A.2d 665 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (pointing out that when defendant acted in

self-defense, "he cannot be held culpable under transfeITed intent doctiine for intentional
crime"). Here, the defense was that DeJesus did not intentionally strike Hansen and if she
did make contact with him, she inadvertently did so while defending herself against
Khan's imminent attack. R.40.
The State's case was not strong and rested on the guard's testimony. As outlined
supra at 25, the guard testified inconsistently regarding Khan's location. R.60, 70.

Although he testified that Khan was a few feet behind him, he also testified on crossexamination, Khan was "on [Hansen's] back" and he "d[id]n't know exactly where she
was" as he "could not see" Khan. R.70. Hansen later claimed at the evidentiary hearing
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that the video showed Khan "was disengaged" and was about four to six feet behind
Hansen when DeJesus kicked him. R.175 :3.
This testimony alone demonstrates the significance of the video-the jury could
have viewed it and detennined for themselves whether Khan was on Hansen's back or a
few feet behind him. They also would not have been left only with Hansen's memory of
what he thought the video showed- that memory could have been clouded by his own
involvement in the incident, his heightened emotional state when viewing the video
immediately after the incident and a multitude of other factors including the lighting and
other conditions under which he viewed the video. In order to advance a meaningful
defense, DeJesus needed the video, not just the guard 's depiction of it.
The recording would have shown the alleged altercation and Khan's position
relative to DeJesus and the guard. The quality of the video is not in question and it was
not cumulative of any evidence produced. Its loss prevented the jury from viewing the
events as they actually occurred, which would have allowed them to draw their own
conclusions and determine if DeJesus unintentionally struck Hansen while reasonably
defending herself against Khan's attack. Thus, the video was critical and it was likely that
it was outcome determinative.
The video recording was also significant because the state's case was built solely
on Hansen's testimony. "Because no other secondary or substitute evidence was
available, the case was reduced to a credibility contest" between Hansen, Ataata, and
DeJesus, had she elected to testify at trial. Merriman, 410 S.W.2d at 793-94. In the
absence of the video recording, DeJesus was left with the difficult task of rebutting
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Officer Hansen's testimony that Khan was several feet away when DeJesus struck him.
That task was particularly difficult in light of the credibility problems that likely arose
due to the relationship between DeJesus and Ataata, and their status as prison inmates.
See Pettit, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 1111. "The video camera was an objective witness that bore

neither the potential pro-defense leanings of the [State's] witnesses nor the credibility
problems of [DeJesus and Ataata]." Id.
The video provided the only objective account of the events that transpired and its
destruction hindered the most accurate detennination of DeJesus's case. By failing to
preserve the video, the State deprived DeJesus of evidence that critically prejudiced her
defense and denied her a fair trial in violation of Utah's due process protection. Thus,
dismissal is required because it would be fundamentally unfair to require her to defend
herself in the absence of this evidence.
11.

The state's failure to preserve the recording was highly culpable and
weighs in favor of dismissal.

The state's failure to preserve the recording went beyond "mere negligence" as
outlined supra at 28-31. A video that captures an alleged crime is almost always highly
probative and should be preserved. But when the video captures an incident between a
guard and an inmate, the video can be critical to the defendant's ability to mount a
meaningful defense since a jury is likely to believe the testimony of a guard over a felon.
Id. In this case, both the investigator and Hansen recognized the importance of the video

immediately after the incident but failed to take adequate steps to ensure that a pe1manent
copy was produced. Nor did the captain, who could have easily downloaded the video,
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make a pennanent copy. The unnamed control person likewise should have known the
importance of the video and followed-up on its preservation. Moreover, the lack of
policies for preserving videos of incidents in the prison and the fact that the destruction of
the video is not an isolated occurrence, further demonstrates the State's high degree of
culpability in failing to preserve this evidence. 6
In the end, while prejudice to DeJesus alone wan-ants reversal, the State's
culpability also weighs in favor of dismissing these charges. The ability to preserve the
recording was within the State's power, it would have required very little effo1t to do so,
and the failure to ensure that the video was recorded demonstrated utter disregard for
DeJesus's due process right to discovery and to present a meaningful defense. The trial
comt's order should therefore be reversed and this case dismissed.
C. This issue is preserved.
DeJesus preserved this issue for review. She filed a Motion to Dismiss for
Failure to Preserve Evidence (R.37-44), a reply memorandum after the State responded
to the Motion to Dismiss (R.78-85), and a Supplemental Memorandum in Support of the
Motion to Dismiss. R.92-100. Three hearings were held (R.172, 174, 175) and the trial
court ruled in a memorandum decision. R.126-140. Additionally, DeJesus filed a petition
for interlocutory review of the order at issue in this case, which the comt of appeals

6

The State's degree of negligence or culpability involves a legal conclusion. Tiedemann,
2007 UT 49, ,r12. But even if it were a finding, the comt's determination that there was
"no culpable conduct by anyone in the Department of Corrections" is clearly erroneous
since negligence, which the tiial comt recognized, is culpable conduct.
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denied. R.143-44. DeJesus then pied guilty, specifically preserving her right to appeal
this ruling. R.153; 173:1, 3-4.
Throughout, DeJesus argued that the charges against her should be dismissed
because her state due process rights, as recognized in Teidemann, were violated by the
State's failure to preserve this evidence. As part of that argument, DeJesus acknowledged
the holding in Otkovic that "[i]f, as a threshold matter, a defendant can show 'that there is
"a reasonable probability that lost or destroyed evidence would be exculpatory,"' then the
trial court is obligated to consider two additional factors." (R.39, quoting Otkovic, 2014
UT App 58, ,J24). But she also pointed out that "a trial court can find there is a due
process violation and dismiss the case based on a balancing of the rule 16 factors alone.

Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49 at 141." R.94. And she clarified that "a defendant need not make
any showing before a court must consider" and balance the rule 16 factors, along with the
factors considered by other states. R.93-95. She further clarified that "[a] balancing of the
rule 16 factors in [her] case is sufficient to grant her Motion to Dismiss." R.96.
An issue is preserved when it is "raised directly or indirectly, so long as it is
'raised to a level of consciousness such that the tiial court can consider it."' Hill v.

Superior Prop. Mgmt. Servs., Inc. , 2013 UT 60, ,J57, 321 P .3d 1054. Here, DeJesus raised
the issue in a timely manner, specifically argued her claim that her state due process
rights under Tiedemann were violated, pointing out in pait that that Tiedemann did not
require a threshold showing of reasonable probability and also that the reasonable
probability test did not require her to prove that the recording "was in fact exculpatory."
R.94-96, 97. This brought the issue "to a level of consciousness such that the trial comt
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[could] consider it," and the trial comi did in fact reach the issue. It therefore is
preserved.
Even if DeJesus's claim had not been preserved, however, it could be reviewed
under the doctrine of exceptional circumstances. See State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 7-8 (Utah
Ct. App. 1996). "The exceptional circumstances concept serves as a 'safety device,' to
assure that 'manifest injustice does not result from the failure to consider an issue on
appeal."' Id. at 8 (citation omitted). Although it "is used sparingly," the doctrine allows
review in exceptional situations involving "'rare procedural anomalies."' Id., citing State

v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1209 n.3 (Utah 1993). "Such anomalies have included a
defendant being convicted of something that was no longer a crime, the entry of final
judgment by a commissioner with no authority, and a major shift in interpretation of
settled law." State v. Fouse, 2014 UT App 29, ,l18 n.4, 319 P.3d 778; see also State v.
Harris, 2012 UT 77, ,l24, 289 P.3d 591 , (indicating exceptional circumstances doch·ine

might allow review "when errors not excepted to are so clearly erroneous and prejudicial
to the rights of a defendant that an appellate comi will of its own accord take notice
thereof') (citation and quotation marks omitted).
This circumstance, where controlling authority from the court of appeals
incon-ectly interpreted a decision from this Court, provides such a rare procedural
anomaly. The parties are required to acknowledge controlling case law and the district
court ordinarily is required to follow decisions of the court of appeals. Although DeJesus
argued below that a threshold showing of reasonable probability was not required, even if
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she had not, this issue could be reviewed under the doctrine of exceptional circumstances
because the court of appeals' decision in Otkovic set that standard.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, DeJesus respectfully requests that this Comt
reverse her conviction and dismiss the charges against her.
SUBMITTED this

·J.]

day of September, 2015.

JOAN C. WATT
ALEXANDRA S. MCCALLUM
\VESLEY J. HOWARD
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

Tab A

3RD DIST. COURT - WEST JORDAN
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
FINAL PRETRIAL CONFERENCE
CF.ANGE OF PLEA
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.
LISSETTE MARIAN DEJESUS,
Defendant.

Case No: 141400093 FS
BRUCE LUBECK
Judge:
April 23, 2015
Date:

custody: USP

PRESENT
rhondam
Clerk:
Prosecator: MAGEE, COLLEEN K
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): HOWARD, WESLEY J
DEFENDANT INFOR!-lATION
Cate of birth: July 2, 1981
Sheriff Office#: 248038
Audio
Courtroom 32
Tape Number:

Tape Count: 1:52 - 2:01

CHARGES
l. ASSAULT BY PRISONER - 3rd Degree Felony

Plea: Guilty

- Disposition: 04/23/2015 Guilty

Defendant waives time for sentence .
HE.l\RING

Jury Trial scheduled for April 29, and April 30th is stricken based on plea agreeme~t
in this case.
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of ASSAULT BY PRISONER a 3r d Degree Felony, the
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah
State Prison.
COMMITMENT i s to begin immediately .
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To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your custody for
transportation to the Utah State Frison where the defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Prison term to run concurrent to any commitments currently serving.
CUSTODY
The defendant is present in the custody of the Department of Corrections Utah State
Prison - Draper.
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ORDER OF CERTIFICATION
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This case is before the court on Defendant' suggestion for certification filed
pursuant to rule 43(b)(l) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Based upon the
affirmative vote of at least four judges of the Utah Court of Appeals,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this appeal is certified for immediate transfer to
the Utah Supreme Court for determination.
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DURHAM , Chief Justice :
INTRODUCTION

~1
tdgar Tiedemann is charged with three counts of murder ,
a fi r st degree felony . This court granted Tiedemann's petition
for interlocutory appeal from two pretrial orders .
First , he
appealed the pretrial order denying his motion to suppress
statements a l legedly obtained in violation of t h e state and
federal constitutions and Miranda v . Arizona, 384 U. S . 436
(1966 ).
Second , Tiedemann appealed the order deny ing his motion
to dismiss based on the State ' s destruction of potentially
exculpatory evidence.
BACKGROUND

~2
The State alleges that on November 2 , 1991 Tiedemann
shot and killed Susan Sessions , Charles Timerberman , and Scott

Bunnell . 1 Sess i ons, Timerberman, and Bunnell were staying at
Tiedemann ' s West Valley tra i ler home for the night . Following
the shootings, the police took Tiedemann into custody where two
police officers , Detective Ron Edwards and Sergeant Ed Spann,
questioned h i m about the ki llings .
In the course of questioning ,
Tiedemann confessed to the murders.
q3
The interrogation was videotaped and transcribed in
part. The officers began the interrogation by reading Tiedemann
h is Miranda rights . When asked if he understood his rights,
Tiedemann answered in the affirmative . 2 The officers then asked
Tiedemann if he understood that he could stop the questioning at
anytime, to which he responded "ya . " The officers then asked
Tiedemann if he still wished to speak with them at that time , and
Tiedemann agreed . When asked by the officers if he was
intoxicated, Tiedemann stated that he was intoxicated on Toluene,
a paint thinner . The officers proceeded with the interrogation .

q4
As t h e officers continued the questioning, they asked
Tiedemann about the shootings. Specifically, Detective Edwards
asked , "What happened to [Ms . Sessions)?" Tiedemann answered, "I
don ' t want to talk about it . " Detective Edwards responded , "You
don ' t want to talk about it?" and Tiedemann responded , "No . "
Sergeant Spann, attempted to clarify exactly what Tiedemann did
not want to talk abo u t by asking , " What is it that you don ' t want
to talk about?" Before Tiedemann responded ,
Sergeant Spann
continued with , "You said murders in West Valley, where in West
Valley?"
~5
Sergeant Spann tried again to clarify Tiedemann ' s
response by asking, "[w)hat part do you and what part don't you
want to talk to us about?" Again , before Tiedemann clarified ,
Detective Edwards asked, "Edgar do you remember me reading [ you
your) rights earlier and you signing a waiver for us to search
your home? " Tiedemann answered, "Ya." Detective Edwards
continued questioning Tiedeman n about the murders .
q6
During the course of the interrogation , Tiedemann
stated that he had "all kinds" of "mental problems . " He informed
the officers of a stroke he had in 1 988 . He told the officers,
~ Scott Bunnel l died in February 2001 due to the injuries he
sustai n ed on November 2 , 1 991 . Accordingly, with respect to Mr .
Bunnell, the original charge for attempted murder was changed to
murder.
2

Although the transcript of the interrogation recorded
T~edemann ' s response as being "inaudible," a viewing of the video
reveals ~hat Tiedemann , with head down and in a muffled tone ,
said "ya."
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"I think I'm Adolf Hitler." He also claimed that "the devil"
told him to shoot the victims. At the end of the interrogation,
Tiedemann affirmed that the police had not threatened him or
promised anything, but that he made the statements of his own
free will . The entire interroga tion lasted less than one hour .
j7
The State originally charged Tiedemann with two counts
of aggravated murder and one count each of attempted aggravated
murder, aggravated kidnaping, and aggravated sexual assault . The
charges were dismissed seven months later after Tiedemann was
declared incompetent to stand trial . At that time , the State did
not anticipate refiling charges because, based on his competency
evaluation, Tiedemann was unlikely to ever be found competent to
stand trial . Tiedemann was then civilly committed to the Utah
State Hospital.

j8
Two years later, in April 1994, the state evidence
custodian notified the investigating officer that physical
evidence from the case would be destroyed unless an objection was
filed within thirty days.
The officer made no objection, and the
evidence was destroyed.
The destroyed evidence included two
revolvers, a Code R kit , a victim' s wallet, heroin, an audio
tape, a b l ood specimen, a make - up kit , drug paraphernalia,
various items of victims' clothing, bedding, a bone fragment
found on one victim's bed, a bottle of green liquid, a one gallon
can of Toluene, . 38 and . 22 caliber bullets , bullet fragments,
shell casings, hair and saliva sam9les, and gunshot residue from
Tiedemann and one of the victims .

~9
Not all of the evidence was destroyed . The ev idence
given to the defense in this proceeding included autopsy photos
and reports on all three victims, toxicology reports on the
victims, a rape report from St . Mark's Hospital, photos taken of
weapons and ammunition, firearm analysis reports, transcripts of
interviews ta k en from one of the shooting victims and the sexual
assaul t victim, witness statements, a videotape of the interview
with the sexual assault victim, and a videotape and photos of the
crime scene.
jl0 In October 2002, the district attorney ' s office was
notif ied that Tiedemann was going to be released from the Utah
State Hospital.
The State subsequently recharged h i m with three
counts of murder , declining to refil e the other felony counts.
Following a preliminary hearing, the trial court found Tiedemann
competent to stand tri al and denied his pretrial motions to
suppress his testimony and to dismiss the case due to destruction
of evidence.
This court granted Tiedemann's petition for
interlocutory appeal from both rul ings . We have jurisdiction
pursuant to Utah Code section 78 - 2-2 (3) (h) (2002) .

3
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STANDARD OF REVIEW

ill In reviewing the trial court's denial of Tiedemann's
Motion to Suppress Illegally Obtained Statements, we review the
trial court ' s factual findings for clear error and we review its
conclusions of law for correctness. State v . Trover, 910 P.2d
1182 , 1186 (Utah 1995).
il2 Whether the State's destruction of potentially
exculpatory evidence violates due process is a question of law
that we review for correctness.
"However, because this question
requires application of facts in the record to the due process
standard, we incorporate a clearly erroneous standard for the
necessary subsidiary factual determinations." Chen v. Stewart ,
2004 UT 82, i 25, 100 P.3d 1177.
ANALYSIS

~13 This case presents two issues : first , whether
Tiedemann validly waived his Miranda rights and , if so, whether
he subsequently, unambiguously invoked his right to remain
si l ent ; and second , whether the destruct ion of evidence in this
case violated Tiedemann's due process rights under the state and
federal constitutions. The court addresses these issues as
f o l lows : Part I of this opinion treats the Motion to Suppress
the Confession as it relates to (A) whe t her Tiedemann waived his
right to remain silent, and (B) whet her Tiedemann subsequently
reinvoked his right to remain silent; Part II deals with the
destruction of evidence.
This opinion contains the majority as
to Part IA . The majority opinion of the court as to Part IB is
contained in the separate opinion of Justice Durrant, joined by
Justices Nehring and Pa rrish . The dissenting view in Part IB of
this opinion is mine alone . Pa rt II of this opinion contains the
majority view of the court on the destruction of evidence
question .
In a separate opin ion , Justice Wilkins dissents as to
Part IB and as to Part II .
I .

MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE CONFESSION

~14 We first address whether the district court was correct
in denying Tiedemann ' s request to suppress his confession.
Tiedemann argues that he never gave a voluntary waiver of his
right to remain silent, but rather , that the police took
advantage of his known mental impairment to improperly evoke a
waiver and confession fr om him . Tiedemann also argues that , even
if he gave a valid initial waiver, he later unambiguously raised
his right to remain silent, and the officers failed to honor that
request in violation of his due proc ess ri ghts .
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~15 This court addressed the threshold requirements for a
valid waiver of Miranda rights and a subsequent invocation of
those rights i n State v . Leyva , 951 P . 2d 738 (Utah 1997) . Leyva
firmly established that " ( t]he questions of waiver of Miranda
rights and of postwaiver invoca t ion of those rights are ent ire ly
separate." Id. at 743 . We therefore address Tiedemann's init ial
waiver and the subsequent raising of his right to remain silent
separately .
If the initial waiver was not valid, the statements
mus t be suppressed.
If , however , the initial waiver was valid,
we must determine if Tiedemann later validly invoked his right to
remain silent.
A.

Tiedema nn's Initial Waiver Was Valid

~16 With regard to the initial waiver of Miranda rights ,
this court has noted, in accordance with federal case law, that a
"' heav y burden ' rests on law enforcement officers ' to demonstrate
that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived' his
Miranda rights ." Leyva , 951 P . 2d at 743 (quoting Miranda v .
Arizona, 384 U. S . 436 , 475 (1966)) . The burden therefore rests
on the State to show that a suspect ' s waiver of Miranda rights
was clear and unambiguous, as well as voluntary.
~17 In this case, the inte rrogating officers read Tiedemann
his rights and asked him if he understood them.
Tiedemann,
a lthough appearing distant and with his head lowered, answered in
the affirmative . Further, Tiedemann responded in the affi rmative
to each of the following questions :
(1) "Do you understand that
you can stop this q u estioning a t anytime?" (2) "If you cannot
afford an attorney, we will provide one for you . Do you
understand that?" and (3) ''Do you still wish to speak to us at
this time? "
~18 In its Memorandum Decision , the district court
concluded that the officers did not use coercive tact ics to gain
the Miranda rights waiver . Having reviewed the transcript and
video of the interrogation , we agree . The officers did not use
"false fri end or "half truth tactics. They made no threats or
promises . The interrogation was less than one hour in length .
The officers did not deny any special requests by the defendant .
We could not find a single instance in which the officers
mis t reated Tiedemann or acted unethically in any way . Although
Tiedemann was admittedly intoxicated at t he time and was later
found to be incompetent to stand trial, his mental condition
alone, absent some abuse by the officers, is not enough to render
his waiver invalid.
See Colorado v . Connelly , 479 U.S. 157, 167
(1986) ("[C]oercive police activity is a necessary predicate to
the finding that a confession is not ' voluntary ' within the
meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . ");
State v. Rettenberaer, 1999 UT 80, ~ 17, 984 P . 2d 1009 ("Although
11

11
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. a determination of i nvol untariness cannot be predicated
solely upon a defendant ' s mental sta t e , his mental state is
re l evant to the extent it made him more susceptible to mentally
coercive police tactics ." (int ernal quotation marks omitted ) ) .
~[19 Because Tiedemann ' s waiver was clear and unambiguous ,
and because he was not coerced in any way , we conclude that
Tiedemann effectively waived his Miranda rights .
B.

Tiedemann Unambiguou sly Reasserted
His Right to Remain Silent

,20 Because Tiedemann validly waived h is Miranda rights, in
order for this court to reverse , I believe we must conclude that
his later attempt to invoke his right to remain silent was
unambiguous . The right to termi nate questioning is a " critical
safeguard" of the right to remain silent guaran teed by the Fifth
Amendment . 3 Michigan v . Mosley , 423 U. S . 96 , 103 (1975) .
In
Miranda , t he United States Supreme Court underscored the
importance of a suspect ' s ri g ht to end an interrogation and
provided general operational gui dance when it stated that
quest i oning must stop once a suspect " indicates in any manner , at
any time .
. du r ing question ing , that he wishes to remain
silent . " Miranda v . Arizona , 384 U. S . 436, 473 -7 4 (1966) ; see
also Mosley, 423 U.S . at 100.
~21 The more difficult question, one left unanswered in
Miranda , is how law enforcement officials are to know when a
suspect has given a sufficient "indication" of a wish to remain
silent . The United States Supreme Court answered this quest i on
in Davis v . United States , 512 U. S . 452 (1994) . Mr . Davis was
accused of beating a sailor to death with a poo l cue a f ter the
sailor had reneged on a billiards wager .
Id . at 454 . After
waiving his Miranda rights and submitting to an hour and a half
of interrogation , Mr . Davis mused , " Maybe I should tal k to a
lawye r. "
Id . at 455 . The Court concluded that this statement
was too equivocal to serve as an invocation of Mr . Davis ' right
to counsel .
Id. at 462 .
The Court held that a suspect ' s
reassertion of the right to counse l " ' requires , at a minimum,
some statement that can reasonably be constru ed to be an
expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney .' " Id .
at 459 (quot i ng McNeil v . Wisconsin , 501 U. S . 171 , 178 (1991)) .
Mr. Davis ' choice of the word "maybe" injected sufficient

3

As t h is court noted in Leyva , because we have never
established t he ex i stence of Miranda protections under Lhe Utah
Constitution, issues concerning Miranda are a n alyzed us i ng
federal law and the provisio ns of the United States Constitution .
Leyva , 951 P . 2d at 743 .
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equivocation into his comment to allow the officers to continue
quest i oning him.
~22 I measure Tiedemann ' s statement "I don ' t want to ta l k
about it" against the core Davis test as modified to encompass
the right to remain silent .
I f ind it impossible to extract
ambiguity from the following critical question and answer
exchange between Detective Edwa rds and Tiedemann:
Det . Edwa rds : What happened to [Ms .
Sessions]?
Tiedemann :
I don't want to ta lk about it .
Det . Edwards : You don ' t want to talk about
it?
Tiedemann :
No .
123 I find Tiedemann's statement, "I don ' t want to tal k
about it," and subsequent confirmation of his desire not to talk
about it an unambiguous invocation of his right to remain silent.
Contrary to the view expressed by Justice Wilkins , I believe that
this pivotal exchange between Detective Edwards and Tiedemann
clearly passed the Davi s test.
The law cannot deprive defendants
of their constitutional rights based on failure to use precise
terminology.
Officers need to be alert to various statements and
behaviors expressed by defendants that meet the required
threshold of clarity .
In my view , Ti edemann met his burden to
unambiguously invoke his constitutional right to remain silent
with his statement "I don ' t want to talk about i t," followed by
repeated silence in respo~se to subsequent questions .
~24 What remains arobiguous, however, is the scope of
Tiedemann ' s invocation.
The antecedent o f the pronoun "it" is
unc l ear.
"It" could refer to "wha t happened to [Ms. Sessions];"
or "it 11 could refer to "[t]he murders out there at West Valley ,"
a response Tiedemann made to a question only moments before the
exchange quoted above; or "it 11 could refer to all of the events
related to the murders . The United States Supreme Court has
ext ended to cr iminal suspects " [t)hrough the exercise of [this)
option to terminate questioning 11 the right to "control the t i me
at which questioning occurs, the subjects discussed , and the
duration of the interrogation . 11 Mosley , 423 U.S . at 103- 04.
I
recognize that interrogating officers who know tha t a suspect has
reclaimed his or her right to rema in silent but do not know the
scope of the reclamat ion have a difficult line to wa l k.
The
difficulty aris es because question s poseo by interrogators in
this settir.g will seldom elicit answers t h at c lar ify the scope of
the suspect ' s right to remain silen~ without also including
i nculpatory statements . This p r oblem may be solved by
disqualifying from cons i deration any inculpatory statements made
in response to questions pos ed by interrogators who are in the

7
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process of attempting to clarify the scope of a reasserted right
to remain silent.
Such a rule will relieve law enforcement of
the daunting task of formulating questions that wou ld clarify the
scope of the Miranda invocation but not in vite inculpatory
statements .
!25 Given Tiedemann ' s unambiguous invocation of his right
to remain silent, but accompanied by ambiguity as to the scope of
such an invocation, I conclude that the police officers were
entitled either to stop their interrogation completely or to
properly seek clarification regarding the scope of Tiedemann's
i nvocation. There fore, their question "What don ' t you want to
talk abo ut?" 4 was legitimate . However, on the two occasions
Tiedemann was asked to clarify what "i t " was that he did not want
to talk about , he was denied the opportunity to answer . In the
fi rst instance , Sergeant Spann asked Tiedemann two questions at
once , " What is it that you don't want to talk about?" and "You
said murders in West Valley, where in West Valley?" Tiedemann
answered only the second question regarding the location of the
murders.
In the second instance, Sergeant Spann asked Tiedemann
"[w]hat part do you and what part don ' t you want to talk to us
abou t ?", but before Tiedemann answered, Detective Edwards asked,
" Edgar[ ,] do you remember me reading you[r] rights earlier and
you signing a waiver for us to search your home?" Tiedemann
answered only Detective Edward's question, and Detective Edwards
continued asking Tiedemann about the shootings .
!26 I agree with Justice Wilkins that " the officers were
careful to inquire as to what Tied emann did , and did not, want to
talk about . "
Infra! 61 . But, in my view, the officers ' actions
demonstrated that they recognized that Tiedemann wished to invoke
his right to remain silent.
When the ir careful inquiry failed to
eli c it clarity regarding the scope of Tiedemann's invocation,
Justice Wilkins concludes, albeit based on his view that
Tiedemann ' s invocation was ambiguous , that "the officers properly
continued questioning." Id . The better conclusion , in my view ,
is that the officers should have respected Tiedemann ' s invocation
and ceased their interrogation when their attempts to clarify the
scope of the invocation were unsuccessful .
!27 With respect to the pauses following questions posed by
the officers during the interrogation as described by Just ice
~\J ilk.ins , I agree that the "o f ficers al lowed ample time for Mr.
Tiedemann to respond" and that he "failed to do so ." Infra! 63.
In my view, however, Tiedemann's failure to respond underscored
his unambiguous invocation of his right to remain silent.

The transcript mist a kenly substitutes "why" for "what . "
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t28 I also wish to comment on the majority ' s interpretation
of the word "it" in Tiedemann ' s statement "I don ' t want to talk
about it . " As amply illustrated by the fact that there are three
separate opinions on this particular issue , I think thi s court ' s
ability to accurately determine the meaning of the pronoun "it"
is limited .
In addition , I believe that the majority ' s
instruction to the district court to retroactively apply its
i nterpretation through a systematic question-by-question parsing
of the interrogation transcript will be difficult and confusing. 5
129 Following Tiedemann ' s invocation of his right to remain
silent and before the officers continued their interrogation ,
the officers should have clarified what , if anythi ng, Tiedemann
was willing to talk about .
Having failed to do so , the officers
were not , in my view, entitled to continue their interrogation.
Because I conclude that Ti edemann was denied the opportunity to
clarify the scope of his unequivocal invocat ion of his Miranda
rights , I also conclude that all of Tiedemann ' s interrogation
subsequent to his statement "I don ' t want to talk about i t "
should be suppressed, and therefo r e dissent from the opinion of
Justice Durrant for the majority of the court on this question .
II.

DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE

130 Tiedemann argues that the State ' s destruction of
evidence is a violation of Federal Due Process under the Fifth
Amendment because the evidence may have been exculpatory , no
comparable evidence st i ll exists , and the destruction was done i n
bad faith.
Tiedemann therefore asks that the trial court ruling
be reversed and the charges dismissed .
t31
In the alternative , Tiedemann asks this court to look
to article I , section 7 of the Utah Constitution and adopt an
analysis that considers several factors, including the State ' s
culpability in destroying the evidence , the significance of the
evidence destroyed, and the prejudice of the destruction to the
defendant .

For example, the majority opinion would admit Tiedemann ' s
answer to the question "Why did you shoot them? " found on page 3
of the transcript , because the question "did not reference a
particular victim." Infra t 56 . However , the same question ,
when asked on page 34 of the transcript would not be admitted
because it becomes clear from Tiedemann's answer, "I don ' t know,"
and the very next question , "Why did you shoot Scotty and Chuck
then?" that the officers were referencing all three of the
victims in the prior question.
I question the wisdom of
requiring the trial court to undertake this sort of linguistic
interpretation.
9
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A.

State Constitu tional Standard

~32 Tiedemann ' s brief in this matter c l early raises and
extensively briefs state law claims . The State argues that
Tiedemann failed to preserve his state law arguments before the
trial cou rt.
The State further contends :
This Court should also decline to
address defendant ' s state constitutiona l
claim because he has not adequatel y developed
it using " historical a n d textual evidence ,
sister state l aw, and policy arguments in the
form of economic and sociological materials
to assist [ the Court) in arriving at a proper
interpretation of the provision in question. u
Society of Seoarationists , Inc. v. Whiteh ead,
870 P . 2d 916 , 92 1 n . 6 (Utah 1993) . Wh ile
defendant does cite to sister state law , he
fails to analyze his claim within " the unique
context in wh i ch Utah ' s constitution
developed . u Indeed , he does not even mention
that the language of the federal and state
due process clauses are i dent ical or explain
wh y , given that circumstance , the clauses
should be interpreted differently .
(first alteration in original) (quoting State v. Bobo , 803 P . 2d
1268 , 1272 n . 5 (Utah Ct . App . 1990)). We have quoted the State ' s
argument at length because we wish to address what we view as a
fundamental misconception of the logic of i~d proper approach to
state constitutional law development .
133 First , the pre servation argument is clearly
inapplicable here . The State concedes in its brief that
Tiedemann did in fact request that the trial court decide the
question as a matter of state law , and the trial court ' s
memora ndum decision indicates as much . Second , the State ' s
position that the analysis of federal constitutional provisions
constitutes t he default interpretive stance of this court vis - a vis state law is not correct . The fact that the state and
f ederal constitutional language is identical does not require a
claimant to create some threshold for independent ana l ysis of the
state language . This court , not the United States Supreme Court ,
has t h e authority and obligation to i n te rpret Utah ' s
constitutional guarantees , including the scope of due process,
and we owe f e deral law no more deference in that regard than we
do sister state interpretat ion of identical state language . See ,
e.a ., State v . DeBoov , 2000 UT 32 , ~ 12, 996 P . 2d 546
(recogniz ing that article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution
and the Fourth Amendment contain ide nti ca l language , but stating
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that the court "will not hesitate t o give the Utah Constitution a
di f ferent cons truction where doi ng so will more appropriately
protect the r i gh ts of this state ' s c itizen s ") .
Furthe rmore, it
is part of the inherent logic of federa l i s m that stat e law be
interpreted independently and p rior to conside r ation of fed eral
q u es t ions . Han s A . Linde , Firs t Things First : Redi s c overing the
States ' Bills of Riahts , 9 U. Balt L . Rev . 379 , 383- 84 (1980) ;
see also West v . Thomson Newspapers , 872 P . 2d 999 , 1006 (Utah
1994) ("By loo k ing first to state consti t utional prin cipl e s , we
a l so act in accordance with the original purpose of t he federal
system . ") . This is so because the State cannot , conc eptually,
den y rights guarant eed by the federal constitution if the s tate
act i on complained of is unlawful as a matter of state law . Thus ,
if state statu tes , rules , or constitutional principl es preclude
the state act i on in question , t h ere is no need to assess the
federal consti t utionality of that action . See Linde , supra at
383 . Th is ana l ytical approach is known as the "primacy model , "
We s t , 872 P . 2d at 1005- 07, and we h a ve end orsed it in a number o f
cases, see , e . g ., id. at 1006- 07 , 1020-21 (adopting the pri macy
model in the defamation context ) ; State v . Ramirez , 817 P . 2d 774 ,
781 - 84 (Utah 1 991) ( addressing defen dan t ' s c l aim under article I ,
section 7 of the Utah Constitut ion before proceeding to his
claims under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution) ; Amax Magnesium Corp . v . Tax Comm' n , 796 P . 2d 1256 ,
1261 (Utah 1990) (" [I]f t he cha l lenged statute cannot withstand
attack under t he state constitution, there is no reason to reach
the federal question ." ) . We have , however , historically relied
on other approaches , usually because of the way in which such
issues have been framed by the parties . See , e . a ., St ate v .
Larocco , 794 P . 2d 460 , 464-65 , 471 (Utah 1990) {plurality
op i nion) (conducting a federal constitutional analysis of the
defendant ' s u n lawful search claim before conducting a state
constitutiona l analysis , and concluding t hat the search was
reasonable under the federal consti t ution but not und er the state
cons ti tut ion) .
134 Federal constitutiona l discourse and v ocabulary have
dominated constitut ional criminal procedure cases for so long
that it continues to be difficult for lawyers to shift their
per spectives i n state cases . A recent example of suc h
difficulties in Utah was commented on by Justice Stevens in his
separate opinion in Brigham City v . Stuart , 126 S . Ct . 1 943
(20 0 6) (Stevens , J ., concu rring). Th at case was on appeal from
this court ' s review of a search and seizure question in Brigham
City v . Stuart , 2005 UT 13 , 122 P . 3d 506 , rev ' d , 126 S . Ct . 1943
(2006) .
In o ur opinion , we noted the line of Utah cases i n wh ich
we have concluded that Utah ' s search and seizure provisions
(which are identical to those in the federal constitution)
provide "a greater expectation of privacy than the Fou rth
A.~endment as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court . "

11
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Id . i~ 10-11 . We criticized the failure of the appellant to
raise and argue the state claims, and observed : "Where the
parties do not raise or adequately brief sta te constitutional
issues, our holdings become inevitably contingent." Id . ~ 12.
~35 The Un ited States Supreme Court granted certiorari "in
light of differences among state courts and the federal courts of
appeals concerning the appropriate Fourth Amendment standard
governing warrantless entry by law enforcement in an emergency
situation . " Brigham Citv, 126 S . Ct . at 1947 .
In his sepa rate
opinion , Justice Stevens addressed what he viewed as the futility
of the Court's exercise in granting certiorari and resolving the
federal question:
Our holding today addresses only the
limitations p l aced by the Federal
Constitution on the search at issue; we have
no authority to decide whether the police in
this case violated the Utah Constitution.

•

Th e Utah Supreme Court , however , has
made clear that the Utah ConsLitution
provides greater protection to the privacy of
the home than does the Fourth Amendment. And
it complained in this case of respondents'
failure to raise or adequately brief a state
constitutional challenge, thus preventing the
state courts from deciding the case on
anything other than Fourth Amendment grounds .
The fact that this admonishment and
request came from the Utah Supreme Court in
this very case not only demonstrates that the
prosecution selected the wrong case for
establishing the rule it wants , but indicates
that the Utah Supreme Court would probably
adoot the same rule as a matter of state
constitutional law that we rejec t today under
the Federal Constitution.
Id . at 1950 (Stevens , J . , concurring)
citations omitted).

(emphasis added)

(internal

~36 The State ' s resistance to this court ' s treatment of the
state constitutional issues raised in this case reflects the same
short-sightedness described by Justice Stevens in Br igham City .
The federal law on this quesLion will serve only as a contingent
rule in Utah until this court has settled the primary question of
state law, and all parties, including the State, are well - advised
to assist this court in its obligations to interpret that law .

No . 20050676

12

~3 7 Furthermore, we reject the State's suggestion in its
brief that there is a formula of some kind for adequate framing
and briefing of state constitutional issues before district
courts and this court . 6 We have on numerous occasions cited with
favor the tradit ional methods of constitut ional analysis . See ,
sQ_,_ , State v. Gardner , 947 P . 2d 630 , 633 (Utah 1997)
( " In
interpreting the state constitution, we look primarily to the
language of the constitution itself but may also look to
'historical and textual evidence, sister state law , and policy
arguments in the form of economic and sociological materials to
ass is t us in arr iving at a proper interpretation of the provision
in question .'" (quoting Soc ' y of Seoarationists v. Whitehead, 870
P.2d 916, 921 n.6 (Utah 1993))} . We have al s o frequently noted
that mere mention of ~tate provisions wi ll not suffice . We
disagree , however , with the trial court ' s suggestion in its
Memorandum Decision that Tiedemman ' s failure to offer analysis of
the "unique context in which Utah ' s Constitution developed [ or to
show) why this State ' s Constitution should be interpreted
differently than the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution" precluded treatment of the state
claim . His torical arguments may be persuasive i n some cases , but
they do not represent a sine aua non in constitutional analysis .
Further, we do not r equire some showing that fed eral analysis is
flawed in order to undertake independent state interpretation ,
although we have occasionally used such arguments to bolster our
conclusions . See , e . g. , Larocco, 794 P.2d at 467-70 (plurality
opinion} (recognizing "significant confusion" in federa l search
and seizure law and taking the opportunity to simplify search and
seizure rules under the Utah Constitution by interpreting article
I , section 14 to provide greater privacy protections wi~h regard
to automobile searches than the federal constitution}; State v .
Watts , 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 n.8 (Utah 1988) ("[C]hoosing to give
the Utah Constitution a somewhat different const ruction [than the
federal constitution) may prove to be an appropriate method for
insulating the state's citizens from the vagaries of inconsistent
interpretations given to the fourth amendment by the federal
courts ." }
In theory , a claimant could rely on nothing more than
6

We likewise reject the court of appeals ' suggestion in
State V . Bobo , 803 P . 2d 1268 (Utah Ct . App . 1990 ), t ha t an
attorney must follow a set fo rmula in order to adequately brief a
state constitutional issue .
Id . at 1273 n.5 (instructing
attorneys wi shing to raise state constitutional issues in their
briefs to (1) analyze "the unique context in which Utah's
constitution developed"; (2) "demonstrate that state appellate
courts regu l arly interpret even textually s i milar state
constitutional provisions in a manner different from federal
interpretations of the United States Constitution" ; and (3) cite
"authority fron other states supporting the particular
construction urged by counse l").
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plain language to make an argument for a construction of a Utah
provision that would be different from the interpretation the
federal courts have given similar language.
Independent analysis
must begin with the constitutional text and rely on whatever
assistance legitimate sources may provide in the interpretive
process.
There is no presumption that federal construction of
similar language is correct .
i38 In this case, Tiedemann clearly raised the state
constitutional question and submitLed arguments, albeit ones the
trial court found unpersuasive , below. Likewise , in his brief on
appeal , Tiedemann has devoted a separate section of his brief to
the issue o f state due process requiremenLS in the context of
destruction of evidence by the State. He has cited Utah due
process cases and decisions from other state courts construing
their due process requirements, including a number of states that
have rejected the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in
interpreting federal law . Given our call in Briaham City for
litigants to participate in the development of state
constitutional principles, we should not decline to treat the
claims properly raised here .
B.

State Due Process and Destroyed Evidence

139 The question before us is whether a defendan t must show
bad faith on the part of the State in the loss or destruction of
evidence before h e may seek a remedy under state law .
!40 It is a matter of clear Utah law that criminal
defendants are ent i tled to information possessed by the State to
aid in th eir defense.
Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure imposes broad obligations on prosecutors to produce
such information or make it available to a defendant . Utah R.
Crim. P. 16 . We have on numerous occasions enforced its
requ i rements , and we noted in State v. Knight :
The prosecutor ' s good faith should not
have had a ny impact on the tria l court ' s
determinat i on of whether the prosecutor had
violated his discovery duties .
(T]he
prosecutor ' s good faith ignorance does no t
excuse non-disclosure .
If any weight were
given to good faith i gnorance, it would only
encourage after-the-fact justification s for
nondisclosure.
734 P.2d 913 , 918 n . S (Utah 1987) .
~41 We have identified several factors under rule 16 to
guide a trial court's decision on a motion to e xcl ude prosecution
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evidence because of a failure to fully disclose . State v.
Kallin, 877 P . 2d 138, 143 (Utah 1994) . These factors are also
relevant to a motion, like the one here, to dismiss charges for
destruction of evidence.
The nonexclusive factors we consider
under rule 16 are
(1) the extent to which the prosecution ' s
representation [of the existing evidence) is
actually inaccurate, ( 2) the tendency of the
omission or misstatement to lead defense
counsel into tactics or SLrategy that could
prejudice the outcome, ( 3) the culpability of
the prosecutor in omitting pertinent
information or misstating the facts, and
(4) the extent to which appropriate ciefense
investigation woul d have discovered the
omitted or missta t ed evidence.
Id.
Our approach under rule 16 should govern the destruction of
evidence, and the culpability or bad faith of the state should be
only one consideration, not a bright line test, as a matter of
due process under article 1, section 7 of t he Utah Constitution.
~42 Justice Stevens' separate concurrence in Arizona v.
Youngblood, 488 U.S . 51 (1988), argued that "there may well be
cases in which the defendant is unable to prove that the State
acted in bad faith but in which the l oss or destruction of
evidence is nonetheless so critical to the defe n se as to make a
criminal trial fundamental l y unfair." Id . at 61. We agree with
this assessment.
Many states that have explored this question
under their state due process guarantee s h ave also agreed . See,
~ , Tho r ne v . Dep't of Pub. Safety , 774 P.2d 1326 , 1331 (Alaska
1989) (construing the due process clause of the Alaska
Constitution to not requ ire a showing of bad faith); State v.
Mora l es, 657 A.2d 585, 594 - 95 (Conn . 1995) (concluding that the
state due process clause does not have the same meaning as the
federal due process clause and that it requires a ba l ancing of
the materiality of missing evidence, the reasons for its
unava i lability , Lhe like l ihood of mistake by witnesses or juries,
and the pre j udice to the defendant); Hammond v. State, 5 69 A . 2d
81, 87 (Del . 1989) (noting that rules regarding preservation of
evidence are gene rally matters of state law and reaffirming prior
test for balancing degree of negligence or bad faith, importance
of missing evide nc e , and suff i c i ency of othe r evidence in support
of convic t ion) ; Stat e v . Ma ta feo, 787 P . 2d 671, 673 (Haw . 1990)
(recognizing that due process inquiry must go beyond Younablood
because, in some cases, t h e state may d e stroy evidence, i n good
or bad fa ith, that is so c ri tical to the defense that it makes
the rule unfair); Commonwealth v . Henderson, 582 N.E.2d 496, 49697 (Mas s . 1991) ( h olding that Massachusetts' due process rule is
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stricter than the federal rule and requires ba l ancing of the
government's culpability , materiality of the evidence , and
potential prejudice to the defendant); State v . Ferguson , 2
S.W.3d 912 , 914 (Tenn . 1999) (ho l ding that "the due process
principles of the Tennessee Constitution are broader than those
enunciated in the [federa l] Constitution" and " fundamenta l
fairness .
. requires that the State ' s failure to preserve
evidence that could be favorable to the defendant be evaluated in
the context of the entire record") ; State v . Delisle , 648 A. 2d
632 , 642-43 (Vt . 1994) (holding that where the de f endant shows a
reasonable possibility that the lost evidence would be
exculpatory , state constitutional due process standards require
balancing of the culpability of the government , the prejudice to
a defendant , and the importance of the lost evidence) ; State v .
Osakalumi , 461 S . E.2d 504 , 512 (W. Va. 1995) (holding as a matter
of state constitutional law that "fundament al fairness requires
[the court] to evaluate the State ' s fail u re to preserve
potentially exculpatory evidence in the context of the ent i re
record") . 7

7

Ironically , Arizona is one of the states that has adopted
a bright-line bad faith requirement as a matter of state due
process . On remand from the United States Supreme Court in the
Younablood case , the Arizona Court of Appea l s held that " the Due
Process Clause of the Arizona Constitution provides greater
protection than i ts federal counterpart . " State v . Youngblood,
79 0 P.2d 759, 762 (Ariz . Ct . App . 1989) (citation omitted). The
Arizona Supreme Court disagreed . In State v. Younoblood , 844
P . 2d 1152 (Ariz. 1993) , the court relied on prior state law,
including the availability of a jury instruction permitting
inferences from mi ssing material evidence favorable to the
defendant , and held that ''absent bad faith on t he part of the
state, the failure to preserve evidentiary mater i al wh i ch could
have been subjected to tests , the results of which might have
exonerated the defendant , does not constitute a denial of due
process of law under the Arizona Constitution . "
Id . at 1158 .
Ot her states adopting a bad faith rule as a matter of state
law include California , People v. Cooner , 809 P.2d 865 , 886 (Cal.
1991) (rejecting defendant ' s argument that t he court shoul d not ,
as a matter of state law , follow federal cases regarding
destruction of evidence issues and instead appl y ing Younablood to
defendant ' s claims); Kentucky , Co l l i ns v . Commonwealth , 951
S . W. 2d 569 , 572 - 73 (Ky . 1997) (decl ining to reject Youngbl ood
approach based o n defendant ' s argument that the Ken t ucky
Constitution used different wording than the federal
constitution) , and North Carolina , State v . Drdak, 411 S . E . 2d
604 , 608 (N . C . 1992 ) (rejecting defendant ' s destruction of
evidence c laim under the North Caro lina Constitution because he
failed to show bad faith).
No . 20050676
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~43 In Delisle, for example, the Vermont Supreme Court
rejected the use of the Youngblood test as the standard under its
state constitution.
Delisle, 648 A.2d at 643.
In rejecting the
federal standard, the court noted that it believed Younablood was
"both too broad and too narrow . "
Id.
Specifically, the court
stated that Younablood was too broad because it required "the
imposition of sanctions even though a defendant [did not]
demonstrate [] [any] prejudice from the lost evidence . "
Id.
And
it was too narrow because i t "limit[ed] due process violations to
only those cases in which a defendant can demonstrate bad faith,
even though the negligent loss of evidence may critically
prejudice a defendant . "
Id.
The court therefore adopted its own
test .
Id .
Under the test, if a defendant demonstrated "a
reasonable possibility that the lost evidence would be
exculpatory," then the court would determine the proper sanctions
by balancing "(l) the degree of negligence or bad faith on the
part of the government; (2) the importance of the evidence lost;
and (3) other evidence of guilt adduced at trial." Id . at 64243.
~44 Like the Vermont Supreme Court, we be lieve that the
federal rule adopted in Youngblood is "both too broad and too
narrow" to serve as an adequate safeguard of the fundamental
fairness required by article I, sect ion 7 of the Utah
Constitution . Thus, we conclude that some balancing of factors
on a case - by-case basis is required.
That balancing should
embrace the basic principles we have adopted under rule 16 and
the factors mentioned by other states .
In cases where a
defendant has shown a reasonable probability that lost or
destro yed evidence would be exculpatory, we find it necessary to
require consideration of the following:
(1) the reason for the
destruction or loss of the evidence , including the degree of
negligence or culpability on the part of the State ; and (2) the
degree of prejudice to the defendant in light of the materiality
and importance of the missing evidence i n the context of the case
as a whole, including the strength of the remaini ng evidence .

i45 The touchstone for the balancing process is fundamental
fairness.
If the behavior of the State i n a given case is so
reprehensible as to warrant sanction, a sanction might be
available even where prejudice to the defendant is slight or only
speculative .
I f prejudice to the de f endant, on the other hand,
is ext reme, fairness may require sanction even where there is no
wrongdoing on the part of the State .
In between those extremes,
we have confidence that trial judges can strike a balance that
preserves defendants' constitutional rights without undue
hardship to t he prosecution .
i46 In this case, T iedemann has not shown any degree of
culpability or bad faith on the part of the State , and the
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reasons for the loss of t he evidence are entirely routine and
benign : the passage of a very long period of time and the
State ' s assumption , based on expert testimony , that Tiedemann
would never become competent to stand trial . However , as to the
second category of considerations , the trial court has had no
opportunity to review them under the state due process clause ,
and neither party has briefed their application to the facts
here.
Thus, we remand the case to the trial court for further
proceedings on these matters.
CONCLUSION

147 Because the majority concludes that Tiedemann's
responses to certain questions during his interrogation are
admissible, we remand this case to the trial court to determine
which responses are in that category.
Furthermore, we reverse
the pretrial order denying Tiedemann's motion to dismiss based on
the State ' s destruction of potentially exculpatory evidence , and
likewise remand that issue for the trial court ' s consideration in
light of this opinion .

DURRANT , Justice , writing for the ma jority :
148 We agree with our colleagues that Tiedemann validly
waived his right to remain silent. We further agree that a
defendant who wishes to invoke this right after having waived it
bears the burden of clearly communicating that desire . We
d isagree as to whether Tiedemann met this burden . Chief Justice
Durham is of the view that Tiedemann did, in fact, clearly
reinvoke his right to remain silent and would t herefore exclude
all of his answers to question s posed after that reinvocation.
Justice Wilkins is of the view that Tiedemann did not clearly
r einvoke his right and would therefore exclude none of his
answers . We believe the better interpretation lies in between
these two views.
149 A defendant controls his right to remain silent.
He
may invoke it as to all matters or only as to some. He may
choose to discuss some topi cs while eschewing others . By stating
"I don't want to talk about it ,u Tiedemann clearly indicated a
desire not to talk about something. The ambiguity l ies in the
p r onoun "it." What did Tiedemann not want to talk about? Our
reading of the transcript leads us to conclude that , at a
minimum, Tiedemann did no t want to talk about " what happened to
Suzie .u To us th i s much is clear.
It is far from clear ,
howe ver, whether he intended to assert his right to remain silent
beyond this , and we believe the officers were t h erefore entitled
to seek appropriate clar i ficaLion . But in seeking that
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clarification, they were not entitled to direct ques tions
specifically to " what happened to Suzie . "
~50 The transcr ipt reads as follows with respect to
Tiedemann 's first indica t ion that he wished to reassert in some
measure his right to remain silent:
RE (Detective Ron Edwards)
Okay, do you know why we ' re going to talk to
you?
ET (Edgar Tiedemann):
Ya.
RE : What are we going to talk to you about?
ET:
The murders out there .
RE : What murders?
ET :
The murders out t h ere at West Valley .
RE : Who are they?
ET : Suzie, Chuck and Scotty .
RE:
Whose Suzie?
ET : She's the woman I love .
RE:
That you love?
ET : Ya.
RE : What happened to her?
ET :
I don ' t want to tal k about it .
151 The obvious candidate for the antecedent of the pronoun
" it" in "I don ' t want to talk about it" is the immediate ly
preceding question : "What happened to her?" Thus , Tiedemann
effectively stated: "I don ' t want to talk about what happened to
Suzie . " We believe this to be the fairest interpre tation of
Tiedemann's statement . But theoretica lly the antecedent of "it"
may have been " The murders out there at Wes t Valley ," making
Tiedemann's statement the equivalent of "I don ' t want to talk
about the murders out there at West Valley . "
~52 Given this ambiguity as to the scope of Tiedemann ' s
rei nvocation of his right to remain silent, we believe the police
officers were entitled to seek clarificat ion. And we t hink the
manner in which they did so was perfectly appropriate . Sergeant
Spann first asked , "What don ' t you want to talk about?" 8 In
response, Tiedemann stated, '' I love that woman so much."
Sergeant Spann again asked, "What is it that you don ' t want to
talk about? You said murde rs in West Valley , where in West
Valley?" A discussion then fol l owed regarding Tiedemann's
address and the fact that "S uzie and Scotty and they just moved
in last nigh t." Detective Edwards then again asked , "Okay, what
do~'t you want to talk about? Edgar? What don ' t you want to
5

A review of the videotape reveals that this was the
actual question , not the question indicated in the transc~ipt.
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talk about, Ed?" After waiting for a reply for close to ten
seconds, Sergeant Spann stated as fol l ows:
Edgar, we ' re not going to force you [to) talk
about anything . We ' re asking you questions.
As Detective Edwards stated, you can answer[]
this question[] , not answer that question,
answe r this question , not answer that
question.
You don ' t have to answer any of
our questions at all . You can stop at
anytime .
To this Tiedemann replied, "Okay . " Sergeant Spann added, "He
made that clear to you , right?" Tiedemann responded, "Ya."
~53 As we view the videotape, Tiedemann was not denied the
opportunity to clarify the scope of his reinvocation of the right
to remain silent; rather, the officers gave him multiple
opportunities to clarify the scope of his reinvocation.
Further,
the officers emphasized to Tiedemann that he controlled his
right, that he could "answer this question, not answer that
question." The officers were not deceptive, abusive, or
intimidating. Nor did they cut off Tiedemann ' s opportunity to
clarify his reinvocation of his right to remain silent . Despite
this opportunity, at th is point in the interrogatio n, Tiedemann
had unambiguously asserted his right to remain silent only as to
Suzie, but not as to the other victims. Therefore , while the
officers were precluded from asking about Suzie, they were free
to ask about the other victims.

~54 Accordingly , we believe that Detective Edwards was
justified in posing the question "Okay, we were called to your
home on a gunshot. We got in there and seen some people. Who
shot them?" Tiedemann could have answered the question without
reference to Suzie, and the officers were entitled to ask about
the other victims . Tiedemann stated, "Me ," to which Detective
Edwards responded, "You did?" Tiedemann replied, "Ya."
Detective Edwards then asked , "Why did you shoot them?" Again,
Tiedemann could have answered the question without reference to
Suzie, and the officers were ent itled to ask about the other
victims.
Ins te ad Tiedemann volunteered , "I shot Suzie cause I
love her and I shot the other two . "
~55 The interrogation then proceeded, and the officers
asked questions specifically about Chuck and Debra . They then
asked another question that did not reference a particular
victim : '' Okay , why? Why did you shoot them?" Tiedemann again
volunteered information about Suzie: "I shot Suzie cause I love
her, I love her so much ." At this point in the interrogation ,
Detective Edwards asked Tiedemann two questions specific ally
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about Suzie . Further , at various points in the questioning t hat
followed , the off i cers asked Tiedemann questions spe c ifica l ly
about Suzie . We would exclude all of Tiedemann ' s responses to
such questions . But we would allow Tiedemann ' s responses to all
questions that were not specifically about Suzie and could have
been answered as to the other victims without reference to Suzie .

~56
opinion .

We agree with all othe r aspects of the majority

~57 Justice Parrish and Justice Nehring concur in Justice
Durran t ' s opinion .

WILKINS , Associate Chief J ustice , d i ssenting :
~58 I r e spectfully dissent . Once Mr . Tiedemann effectively
waived his righ t to rema i n silent , he was subject to police
interrogation until he unequivocally reinvoked that right.
Careful review of the record, including the video recording of
the crit i cal portion of the inte r rogation, makes onl y one th i ng
clear : Mr. Tiedemann was not unequivocal in any attempt he may
have made to reinvoke his right to silence. As a consequence ,
his statements to the police i nterrogators after voluntari ly
waiving his rights against self- incrimination may properly be
admitted in any trial relating to his multiple murder , attempted
murder , aggravated assault, and rape charges .
~59 All ag ree that Mr. Tiedemann voluntarily and
effective l y waived his right to remain silent when initially
informed of his right to do so . After careful l y reconf irming the
waiver and Mr . Tiedemann ' s understanding of the waiver at the
beginning of the video recording of the interrogation , the
officers ask him what happened . Mr . Tiedemann answers a number
of questions , including some referring to one of the murder
victims , Suzie . When the officer asks what happened to Su zi e ,
Mr. Tiedemann says he does not ''want to talk about i t . "

~60 The confusion , if any , arises from Mr . Tiedemann ' s
response.
It is clear from review of the interrogation video
that the officers were careful to inquire as to what Tiedemann
did , and did not , want to talk about . Mr . Tiedemann failed to
clarify his ambiguous statements, and the off i cers properly
continued questioning . Once Mr . Tiedemann was asked to c l arify
t he meaning of his ~I don' t want to talk about it" statement , the
officers were under no obligation to probe further when the
defendant failed to offer any clarification. Once he waived his
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right to remain silent, Mr . Tiedemann assumed the duty to clearly
and unequivocally reinvoke that right if that was his intention .
An ambiguous statement followed by non-responsive replies to
questions about what he does not want to talk about does not
shift the burden back to the state to figure it out .
161 In addition , when the video of the interrogation is
viewed, it becomes clear that t h e officers acted properly and
gave ample time for Mr . Tiedemann to respond to questioning. The
transcript records the questioning as follows : "Okay , what don't
you want to talk about? Edgar? What don ' t you want to talk
about , Ed? Edgar , we ' re not going to force you to talk about
anything .
u
What the transcript fails to illustrate is the
pauses between each question to allow time to answer . Because
Mr. Tiedemann did not respond to any of the questions , the
transcript shows one question after another .
It could appear
that the officers were barraging Mr . Tiedemann with questions ,
and that Mr. Tiedemann had no time to process, yet alone answer,
the questions .
162 The unedited video, on the other hand, shows that the
officers allowed ample time for Mr . Tiedemann to respond ; he
simply failed to do so . The officers paused between each
question, sometimes for up to ten seconds, to allow h i m to
respond . Mr . Tiedemann failed to clarify his equivocal
statement .
163 As we have said before, "if the suspect is not
reasonably clear in his [attempt to stop ques tioning after
waiving his rights] , officers are not required to stop
questioning or focus on clarifying the suspect ' s statement . u
State v . Levva , 951 P.2d 738 , 742 (Utah 1997) . The officers , i n
the case of Mr . Tiedemann, went beyond what our law requires.
When faced with the ambiguous statement , the officers gave Mr .
Tiedemann ample opportunity to c l early reinvoke his right to
remain silent.
Not only did h e fail to clarify his intent, he
listened to the officers explain again that he could stop
answering at any t ime and that they would not force him to answer
any question . Given this reemphasis and patient inquiry by the
officers , however, he failed to c l ear the ambiguity, and , in
f act , continued to answer questions about Lhe murders and other
crimes .
'Jl64 The law places a "heavy burden" on the state to
in i tia ll y establish a suspect's knowi ng and voluntary waiver of
the constitutiona l right to remain silent in the face of police
interrogation, and rightly so.
Id . at 743 . However , once a
suspect has volun t arily and knowingly waived that right, any
attempt to reinvoke the right shifts the burden, and the
requirement of c l arity , to the suspect .
Id . In other words, the
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law only requires the state to prove the right was lawfully
waived . He who claims to reinvoke the right there after must
prove that it was done with sufficient clarity as to make it
unambiguous . A statement, taken in context, that a suspect
doesn ' t want to talk about "i t ," without more, is insufficient to
shift t he burden back to the state. A careful post-hoc parsing
of the phrasing and language by a reviewing court may be helpful,
but it would impose an unattainable burden on law enforcement ,
and likely result in the need to treat any suggestion as a
"clear" re-invocation of the right waived . Such a result is
neit her required, nor useful.
,6s In the parallel circumstance of a suspect first waiving
and then making an ambiguous request for counsel, we reached the
same conclusion . Relying on reasoning from both our prior
decision in Leyva, and the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Davis v. United States, 512 U. S . 452 (1994), we observed that
the requirement .
. that an officer limit
his questioning to clarifying a suspect's
ambiguous or equivocal invocation of the
right to counsel must be l imi ted to prewaiver
scenarios.
[A]fter a knowing and
voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights , law
enforcement officers may continue questioning
until and unless the suspect clearly r equests
an attorney.
In other words, police do not
need to limit their questioning to clarifying
questions when a suspect who has previously
waived his Miranda rights makes an ambiguous
request for counsel . Furthermore, we see n o
reason why this same rule should be different
for ambiguous assertions of the right to
remain silent. Therefore, because it is
undisputed that [the defendant) voluntari ly
waived his Mi randa rights, the detectives
were free to question him until and unl ess he
unambiguous l y reinvoked either his right to
counsel or his right to remain silent .
State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930 , 935 n . 4 (Utah 1998)
internal quotations omi tted).

(cita tions and

t66 In the case before us , the officers were unab l e to
determine from his statement wh ether Mr. Tiedemann wished to
reinvoke his right to remain si lent .
Due to the equivoca l n ature
of Mr. Tiedemann's statement , and despite being under no
obligation to do so , the officers made reasonable attempts to
understand what h e meant. They asked , "What don ' t you want to
talk about?" After a l lowing ample time for Mr. Tiedemann to
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respond and clarify his statement , which h e did not do, the
officers continued with q uestioning , and Tiedemann confessed to
the murders. The officers were well withi n the bounds of
constitutional behavior in doing so.
~67 The trial court agreed that Mr . Tiedemann ' s
reinvocation of the right to remain silent, if that was what it
was intended to be , was ambiguous . My colleagues concede that
the "scope of Tiedemann ' s invocat i on" was ambiguous.
I do not
read the record or view the video recording of the event to
reveal a n ything other than that Mr . Tiedemann ' s statement was
ambiguous, at most . One cou l d very easily conclude that the
statement was more of an expression of remorse and pain than one
of reinvoked rights .
~68 Ultimately , Mr . Tiedemann knowingly and voluntarily
waived his right to remain silent. Th e heavy burden that rests
upon the state to establish a valid waiver in the first place
shifts thereaft er to the defendant to prove a reinvocation of t h e
waived ri ght . Once he waived his right to silence , this burden
shifted to Mr . Tiedemann.
He failed to unequivocally reinvoke
his right , and his confession is properly subject to admission .
i69 I woul d affirm the decision of the trial court that the
defendant failed to adequately reinvoke his right to remain
silent .
i70 Moreover , given my analysis of the admissibility of Mr .
Tiedemann ' s confession~ to t he _various crimes with which h e is
charged , I see n o possibility , as a matter of law , of any
prejudice arising from the State's destruction of any of the
evidence over the years. Consequently , I would affirm the
decis i on of the trial court on that matter as well .
i71

I would aff i rm.
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IN THE DISTRICT coURT oF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY/
WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF
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JAfJ ~ ICT coui:n
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DEPT,

STATE OF UTAH,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiff,
Case No . 141400093
vs .
Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK
LISSETTE MARIAN DEJESUS
Defendant .
DATE: January 21 , 2015

The above matter came before the court for decision an
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

BACKGROUND
Defendant was charged by an information filed January 14,
2014 with assault by a prisoner.

The charge in summary is that

on September 27, 2013 , while an inmate at the Utah State Prison,
defendant assaulted a guard, Robert Hansen (Hansen) with intent
to cause bodily injury.

After preliminary hearing and a

bindover, defendant entered a plea of not guilty.

On September

12 , 2014, defendant filed a mot ion to dismiss, arguing in summary
that the State had destroyed evidence which merited a dismissal
of the case .
2014.

The State fi led an oppos ition on September 24,

Defendant filed a reply on October 6 , 2014.

Oral argument

was set for October 7, 2014 .
The court heard argument and det ermined .it needed
additional factual evidence , a nd scheduled an evidentiary h earing
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for November 4, 2014, but that was postponed until December 2,
2014, by agreement _of the parties. On November 26, 2014, and
given the holiday, in effect one day before the December 2
hearing, defendant filed a supplemental memorandum in support of
her motion to dismiss.

At that hearing on December 2, 2014, the

court heard evidence and received further argument and again
determined it needed additional evidence and the State requested
additional time to respond to the supplemental memorandum of
defendant recently filed.

The court thus scheduled hearing and

argument for December 18, 2014, but due to an emergency a witness
was unavailable and further evidence and argument was heard on
January 15, 2015.
Throughout each of these hearings defendant was present with
Wesley J. Howard and the State was present through Coleen K.
Witt .
The court heard argument at each of the three hearings .

The

court has considered all of the pleadings filed, including the
attachments which include the transcript of the preliminary
hearing and other mater i als and argument. On January 15, 2015,
the court took the issues under advisement.

Now being fully

advised, the court issues this memorandum decision .

-2-
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Based on the above, the court makes the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Defendant was an inmate at the Utah State Prison on
September 27, 2013 in what is called Timpanogas 3, a female
housing unit at the Utah State Prison. Defendant shared a cell
numbe r 416 with an inmate named Dash. Dash and Khan, a resident
of cell number 415, were being escorted back to their cells by
Hansen after recreation t i me and defendant was in her cell ,
number 416, which is on the second tier and adjacent to number
415.

When the doors were opened defendant came out of her cell

and defendant and K.½an engaged in some form of combat . (The court
is not making any findings, of course, with respect to guilt or
innocence, but only for this motion.)

Khan had been instructed

to go to her cell #415 as Hansen followed but instead went to
stand in front of defendant's cell #416. Hansen then attempted to
insert himself between the defendant and Khan. Hansen pulled
defendant off and tried to push defendant back into her cell and
that failed and defendant came out of her cell again and Hansen
threw defendant to the ground . Hansen testified at the
preliminary hearing that defendant then kicked him twice, in the
abdomen and groin area , after looking him in the eye . Hansen said

-3-
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on direct examination Khan was not anywhere near that area.

On

cross examination he said he did ,10t see Kahn when defendant
kicked him, Khan was behind Hansen, not on his shoulder, but
Hansen could not see I<han .
2. The prison maintains a system of cameras which captured
the events on a digital recorder, similar to a home digital video
recorder, or DVR.

It is not a video tape where an actual,

physical recording is made. That device runs continuously until
it is "full" and then other events shown on the cameras are
captured "over" older images.

It is not a permanent record

unless someone has the Information Technology {IT) department at
the Department of Corrections make, or "burnn a disc from that
recording device.

Thus after approximately 30 days, though there

is no formal policy in place, unless the images selected are
copied onto a permanent medium, sach as a compact disc, the
images captured temporarily are gone and irretrievable as they
are "recorded " over or eliminated in some way not provided to the
court by the evidence.
3 . Defendant's factual claim is that as Hansen was inserting
himself between Khan and the defec1.dant Khan continued to attempt
to strike and harm defendant, and defendant in protecting herself
from Khan accidently struck Hansen without intent to cause bodily
injury .

Thus , she claims, the recording is and would be

exculpatory.

-4-
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4 . Hansen told his supervisor immediately after the event
and wrote a report of the incident .

The investigations division

contacted Hansen later that same day and he gave them a statement
as to what had occurred and received Hansen's written report .
Eansen, within an hour after the alleged assault on September 27,
2013, viewed the recording which was inside the control uni t, he
played it back and could observe it .

He testified that it showed

that defendant kicked him and while doing so, Khan was
approximately 4-6 behind Hansen and was not doing anything
against defendant, merely standing behind Hansen while defendant
and Hansen were engaged in their altercation. Hansen said when he
told counsel on cross examination t nat he di d not know where Kahn
was, that wa s based on what he knew at that time it was
transpiring, but vie.wing the recording made him aware Kahn was 4 6 feet behind him and was not engaging defendant when defendant
kicked Hansen .
5. An investigator, Kemp, was assigned the case and spoke
with the witnesses shortly after the event, including Hansen.
Kemp asked someone, an employee Kemp did not know, in the control
unit to get her, Kemp, a copy of the recording.

Kemp does not

actually work inside the prison and does not know t he names of
the personnel and did not note it.

Kemp is an investigator who

investigates offenses within and without the prison involving
Department of Corrections interes ts.

-5-
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from the event, but on a date unknown, Kemp asked someone, again
not recalling who , about the recording .

Kemp was told by a

captain on the unit that the record was not available and that if
a hard copy had been made, it was lost.

No one, in short, knows

if in fact a hard copy recording was made but no one claims it
exists . Kemp and other investigators at that time of the event
and for about three months afterwards , was given an assignment to
perform background checks which kept her unusually busy beyond
what her normal duties required.
6 . In part based on the press of that other business, the
case was not brought to the office of the District Attorney
(prosecution) until January 7, 2014, by which time the images
captured on the recording device were eliminated and
irretrievably lost.

The case was filed shortly thereafter, as

noted. Defendant filed a discovery request on or about January
29, 2014, asking for any video recordings of the event.

The

State responded and stat ed on or about May 1, 2014, that it was
"unable to provide any video of the incident as none exist as per
the Utah State Prison . "
7. Defendant's cell mate Dash was called as a witness at
the evidentiary hearing of December 2, 2014 .

She refused to talk

about the incident and cited the Fifth Amendment.

The court

observed defendant when that occurred and as Dash left the stand.
Defendant pulled faces and made facial expressions as if to

-6-

000131

question what Dash had just done in open court. The meaning of
the interchange is uncertain to the court.
8 . Another female inma t e, Atata, testified at that same
hearing that she was in another cell on the tier and observed
Khan behind Hansen and that Khan was reaching toward defendant
and trying to strike defendant when defendant hit Hansen.

Atata

has a close relationship with defendant . Atata describes
defendant as her, Atata's, fiance.
true the testimony of Atata .

The court does not accept as

That is not based solely on the

relationship between Atata and defendant, but the court also
observed defendant and Atata while Atata was testifying. It
appeared to the court , and the court so finds, that defendant was
making facial gestures and expressions of varying sorts to Atata
depending on what Atata ·was saying in her testimony.

Further,

Atata admitted she was looking at the event from an angle, as she
was in another cell, and Atata admitted she did not see
everything but saw most of the event.

The court thus does not

accept her testimony at face value as being testimony the court

can rely on to find the events were as she described.

Based on the above findings, the court enters these :

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW and DISCUSSION
The law is set forth in State v . Tiedemann,

162 P.3d 1106
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(UT. 2007). When there is a claim by a defendant that evidence is
lost or destroyed, the court is to engage in a multi-step
process. This court must engage in a balancing of factors.

The

defendant must first demonstrate a "reasonable probability" that
lost or destroyed evidence would be excul patory. It is not
sufficient to show a possibility that the evidence would be
exculpatory .

If a "reasonable probability" is shown, then the

court is to consider the r eason for the destruction or loss or
failure of preservation of the evidence, including the degree of
negligence or culpability on the part of the State, and the
decree of prejudice to the defendant in light of the materiality
and importance of the missing evidence in the context of the case
as a whole, including the strength of the remaining evidence.
The main principle is fundamental fairness.

The Utah Supreme

Court noted that if a sanction is warranted, it could be because
of the serious conduct of the State or the degree of prejudice to
the defendant . Tria l courts are instructed to balance the factors
to insure fairness .
The court m~st first examine, as a threshold, whether
defendant has demonstrated tha t it is reasonably probable that
the recording would be exculpatory . Just what is "reasonably
probableu is not as clear as the court would like.

Here,

defendant produced a witness, her fiance Atata, who said Khan was
engaged in f ighting with defendant when defendaEt struck Hansen .

-8-
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The court is aware at this point only of the prelimi nary hearing
testimony and other testimony given by Hansen on December 2 ,
2014, as well as that of Dash and Atata on that same date .
Whether there are other witnesses, prison staf f or inmates, who
will at trial describe what they observed that day, if there are
any such witnesses, is unknown to the court. Of course the
parties are free to produce whatever witnesses they bel ieve have
relevant information .
The court gives little credit , at this point, based on its
observations of Atata , defendant, and the i r relationship, to the
testimony of Atata. Simply asserting that the recording would be
helpful to defendant is obviously nothing more t han argument that
possibly the recording would be exculpatory.

There must be

something in the evidence before the court NOW that shows the
court there is some reasonabl e basis on which to believe the
recording would show what defendant claims, that the striking of
Hansen was either an accident while defendant was trying to
engage in combat with Khan or that the striking was justified or
o ccurred for some reason other than as claimed by Hansen that it
was done to inflict bodily injury intentionally or knowingly. The
only poss ible evidence defendant can assert that is now before
the court is the testimony of Atata.
to t his court, that

To be reasonable evidence,

evidence must be be l ievable .

To this court,

based on the findings above, the testimony was not believable and
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thus is not reasonable.

A jury may well conclude differently,

however, and the court's belief at this point of course is
irrelevant to what may be presented at a jury trial.

The court

is not indicating such evidence cannot be presented by defendant
at a trial. The court is merely ruling that defendant has not
shown a reasonable probability that the recording would be
exculpatory.
Thus, the court does not need to examine the reasons for the
destruction or failure to preserve nor must the court determine
the degree of prejudice suffered by defendant, if any.

However,

even if it is reasonably probable that the recording is
exculpatory, the reasons for its non-existence do not support a
dismissal. IF the court is wrong about the exculpatory nature of
the recording, dismissal is not appropriate because of the facts
and circumstances which resulted in the fail ure to preserve.
First, in the court's view the State is incorrect about the
des truction of the evidence and motivations.

Obviously the

"prosecution" here has done absolutely nothing to destroy or fail
to preserve evidence .

The destruction came about by t he action ,

or inaction, of the Department of Corrections personnel in
failing to preserve evidence that was readily available at the
time of the incident.

The recording was gone before the case was

filed. The State a rgued wrongly, respectfully, and contrary to
common sense frankly, about motivations .
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exactly as Hansen said, certa inly it would seem to this court
that common sense would indicate that recording would be
retained, the figurative "Exh ibit A", so to s peak, in the case
aga i nst defendant.

The motivation, frankly, to destroy or fail

to preserve such a recording would come if the recording
supported some other factual situation than the one Hansen
describes.

If it showed con1:rary to what Hansen said, then it

would make more logical sense to destroy it rather than if it
supported him. The court does not believe that the lack of the
evidence, however, is related to any "decis ion" made by anyone.
Obviously, it is very difficult, if not impossible, for this
court to understand why prison personnel would not, with full
knowledge that a claimed assault had occurred by an inmate
against a guard, maintain a recording of that event.

Obviously,

if the recording shows what Hansen testified it shows, there is
no prejudice at all to defendant in the destruction of the
recording.

Only if the recording shows in essence what defendant

cla ims would there be prejudice by its unavailablity .

Because

this court does not believe defendant has shown any reasonable ,
believable probability the recording showed what defendant
claims, it does not matter why or how it was destroyed, or more
properly not retained.

But, as indicated, the court

is

discussing that element in the event the court is incorrect about
the exculpatory nature of the event .
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the investigative team, and all associated with this event, would
preclude such a motion and preclude the requirement that the
court attempt to "divine" what the recording showed.
Here, the reasons given for the lack of preservation are
believable, and amount to negligence but not in a high degree.
The court finds no culpable conduct by anyone in the Department
of Corrections. If the court believed that there was an
intentional decision to record over this event, of course, the
result would probably be different .
Hansen cannot cause the recording to be preserved .

The

investigator, the court finds, asked the proper personnel to
"make me a copy" of the event .

It was not intentionally

eliminated, or recorded over, the court finds, but it clearly
should have been retained .

The n~meless person who was asked to

make a recording perhaps, for any number of reasons, evidently
failed to do so.

The investigator, in the press of other

business , failed to follow up in a timely way.

That does not , in

this court's view, favor defendant to the extent that the court
should or could find a malicious motive or culpabl e conduct by
the investigative team at Corrections.

It was negligence, but

negligence born of a multitude of factors and the fact that many
personnel are involved in a setting such as a prison control
unit.

Just why a recording was not made, and who failed to make

that recording, are not found as facts by the court , other than
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it was institutional negligence.

The investigator should have,

respectfully, conducted her investigation in a way that retains
relevant evidence.

This recording was clearly relevant.

The

failure to do so, however, was at most negligence, and not gross
negligence and certainly not intentional.
So, while the court feels it need not examine the reasons
for the lack of preservation, if the court is wrong about there
being a reasonable probability about the exculpatory nature of
the recording, the reasons for the loss of the evidence favor the
State rather than dismissal of the charges . Defendant is still
free to testify and bring witnesses to the trial, though of
course she has not burden to do so. The State is free to present
whatever relevant evidence it has .

The actual participant,

Hansen, has at this point presented credible evidence.

Many,

indeed almost all, assaultive incidents resulting in a trial are
not recorded and the finder of fact is required to listen to the
witnesses and determine what happened.

The fact that this event

happened to be recorded does not mean that the failure to retain
that recording should result in a dismissal of the case .

Defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to preserve
evidence is DENIED.

The matter is set for a sta tus conference at 1:30 p.m. on
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January 29, 2015, where a trial date will be scheduled.

This Memorandum Decision is the Order of the court and no
other order is required.

DATED this

v(

day

of/pfi-,

-14-

2015.
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Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7

Article I, Section 7. [Due process of law.]

No person shall be deprived of life, libe1ty or property, without due process of law.

